governments in general.To further examine the book's worth as a historical guide it is important to note the great details described in terms of process and specifications of the late Arrow. Peden captures a multitude of statistics and draws on technical background making his book an excellent source for facts and figures. Moreover the book explains much of the technical focus of the Arrow project detractors, for this takes up the larger portion of his case. In the event that one should need to back up concepts and theories regarding the Arrow project and the surrounding political and economic affairs, Peden provides an extremely valuable source. There is much to be mentioned in terms of the people who drove the project, engineers, cooperative Americans who's resources made much of the project viable, and the leadership of Crawford Gordon. Unfortunately this source is skimpy on the preceding variables, compromising it's historic worth in terms of key personalities. It would be this papers contention that Peden's work is an excellent source for the enhancement and crystallization of prior knowledge on the subject matter, due to it's technological base. It is also being suggested here that the historic value of the political and decision making process observed throughout the period of the 1956-58, may be oversimplified in Peden's case as he puts less detail into that side of the issue.Insofar as coherence is of concern, this book is decent read as it is easy to follow. There is a bit of jumping from time period to time period. The book commences with talk of Prime Minister John Diefenbaker and his cancellation of the Arrow, Peden then jumps to the need for the interceptor, followed by the origins of the Arrow, and finally discusses the unfinished business of the political externalities. So does this mean that the work was incoherent? Not at all, if one is a hardcore airforce buff and consequently has had prior exposure to the ...
