that a lack of sufficient statistical evidence reduced the goal to a mere belief that it was more effective than extended incarceration. The idea that a potential criminal might consider the possible ramifications of his acts was too abstract a notion to be of any import to substantiate the deterrence goal for capital punishment.The Supreme Court also dismissed the goal of retribution for crimes committed as irrelevant. This goal, said the Furman court, cannot be the states sole end for punishment - proper goals include measurable deterrent effects, isolation of persons dangerous to society, and rehabilitation. Since all three of the proper goals could be accomplished sufficiently through a less severe. less permanent punishment, such as extended incarceration, capital punishment was excessive.The arguments contained in the Furman decision were readdressed by the Supreme Court four years later in Gregg v. Georgia (1976), when it assessed a revised Georgian statute regarding capital punishment. The Gregg court reasoned that the death penalty, under certain circumstances, is not excessive punishment. While using many of the same principles as Furman to arrive at its decision (which is, of course, legal tradition), the Supreme Court in Gregg indicated that some of the goals dismissed by the earlier court were legitimate considerations.The Supreme Court in Gregg found that the carefully drafted statute satisfied the Furman courts concerns regarding application of capital punishment. Implementation of a bifurcated trial process - guilt or innocence determined at the first stage, penalty assessed at second stage with discussion of mitigating or extenuating circumstances and standards on applying them, automatic sentence review - made the application of capital punishment more even-handed, according to the Gregg court.While it agreed with the Furman court that societal acceptance of capital punishment was an important principal, the Gre...
