ous effort to compete head-to-head against the lightweight imports. There are two reasons why this previous strategy failed. First, Harley's entry into the lightweight market jeop-ardized its market image as a manufacturer of prestige machines. This is critically impor-tant for the firm, because according to Hackney, its business is "style and image" [H1, p. 48]. While Harley machines perform well and can reach high speeds, speed and handling are not the important selling points for its products. One source Hackney quoted said that "Harley is in the image busi-ness" [H1, p. 48]. Willie G. Davidson, grandson of the firm's founder, asserted that a Harley's engines must have a special sound and what he calls the LOOK [W1, p. 27]. Second, it would have been nearly impossible for the company to make and sell small motorbikes as profitably as the Japanese firms could. The U.S. automobile industry has been forced to attempt this, but with very limited success. Without import quotas it would be in worse shape still, just as Harley might be defunct if not for the tariff on Japanese heavyweight bikes. It is impor-tant also to point out that the lightweight bikes the Japanese first imported did not di-rectly compete with Harley [G1, p. 8]. Price. The three under-125 cc models mentioned above that Harley had introduced sold in the $495-749 price range. At the time, Honda had four models in this range, selling between $304 and $899. In the under-350 cc market, Harley's models sold for $930 to $1,130, while Honda's were selling for $897 to $1,175 [K2, p. 107]. 1988's prices for Harley models ranged between $4,000 and $13,000 [H2, p. 38]. By 1991 the price range was $4,400 to $14,300 [S3, p. 1097D].Because of the prestigious nature of its reputation, the firm can charge high prices. While nearly every product has some price elasticity, customers expect to pay more for a Harley, and do so willingly, not being deterred by its premium pri...
