tor's tastes. Arguments persist that the erosion of privacy is not such a big deal; the economic benefits of information availability and mobility, it is said outweigh limitations on our personal privacy. Is privacy an ethical nicety, an expendable luxury, then, or is it a basic natural right that needs legal protection? Some philosophers and legal scholars have argued that privacy is an intrinsic good, implying that the right to privacy is fundamental and irreducible. Others contend that privacy is more of an instrumental good. Hence the right to privacy is derived from other rights such as property, bodily security and freedom. While both approaches have validity, the latter seems more compelling. It is especially persuasive when applied to those rights involving our liberty and personal autonomy. A primary moral foundation for the value of privacy is its role as a condition of freedom: A shield of privacy is absolutely essential if one is freely to pursue his or her projects or cultivate intimate social relationships Under the directive, that came into effect on 25 October 1998, the processing of data about ethnic origins, political opinions, religious and philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, health and sex life, is prohibited except where there are special exemptions or derogations. Moreover, in each of the European Union's fifteen Member State, a special authority is to protect individual's rights and freedoms with regard to the processing of personal data. It is to guarantee citizens the right to be informed, to have access to data concerning them and the right to correct it, and to erase data whose processing does not comply with the provisions of the directive. Article 25 states the principle that the transfer of personal data to third countries may only take place if the receiving countries offer a level of protection that is "adequate" within the meaning of EU legislation. In a globalized economy where information ab...
