ccount demands an understanding of the difference between higher and lower pleasures. The absense of such a hierarchy, although incorporating Mill's ideas about perceptions of the world and its tie to well-being on the whole, serves discount the desire Theory's adherence to Mill's account of well-being.The Substantive goods theory postulates that a life is good if it is spent in pursuit of desires that are objectively worthwhile. The main idea here is that there is an objective list of what is worthwhile to pursue. Substantive Goods theorists believe that experiences are not the only component of pleasure; one derives pleasure from doing worthwhile things and having knowledge of such action. Experientialism is in conflict to this idea; knowing that you are actually performing actions does not weigh into consideration in the experientialist point of view. Such a distinction between worthwhile pursuits and pursuits of less value is a qualitative one, similar to that of Higher and lower pleasures. We must enter into reflections in order to surmise what desires are substantive and which we should pursue. From there, we pursue the ones which we deem to have more substance. Such is true of Mill's account of well-being. Mill's account stipulates that we must cultivate our mental faculties and gain knowledge enough so that we can see the difference between higher and lower pleasures. From there we will be focused only upon pursuing higher pleasures because they are incomparable to lower pleasures and anyone who has had such a reflection will realize that higher pleasures are superior to lower pleasures. The Desire Theory has no such distinction and provision for reflection and desires pursuing higher and lower pleasures could be seen as equally serving well-being. An objection that may arise to the connection between Mill's account of well-being and the substantive goods theory revolves around the lack of a requirement in the Substantive goods ...
