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Suez Canal

Suez Canal When Gamal Abdel Nasser overthrew King Farouk of Egypt in 1954, he dreamed of uniting the Arab countries of the world under his rule. Additionally, he sought to bring industrialization and economic modernization to Egypt. The cornerstone of his plan was the construction of the Aswan High Dam. The dam would provide Nasser with a source of hydroelectric power, a means of irrigation, and most of all a source of national pride and recognition. Originally, The United States in cooperation with Great Britain and the World Bank agreed to help finance the construction of the $1.3 billion dam. However, when the United States withdrew from financing the dam, a chain of events was set off which eventually led to the Suez Crisis. Document 30, The Suez Crisis, 1956, from The Cold War: A History through Documents, illustrates this lineage by using excerpts from four sub-documents. The first excerpt, “Withdrawal of U.S. Support for Aswan Dam Project”, vaguely outlined the developments that the United States felt would hinder the construction of the dam. It diplomatically announced the United States’ unwillingness to continue financing the Aswan Dam Project. Nowhere in this excerpt was there a reference made to Egypt’s involvement with communist powers. While it was not directly stated, the United States severed finances for the project because Egypt had recognized the People’s Republic of China in response to the United States continuing support of Israel. Nasser viewed Israel as the stumbling block that was preventing the realization of Pan-Arabism, along with continuing French and British presence in the region. In addition to recognizing China, Egypt was receiving arms from the Soviet Union through Czechoslovakia, a sign that Egypt was developing a relationship with the communist superpower. The withdrawal of U.S. financing led directly to Nasser’s decision to nationalize the Universal Suez Canal Company on July 26, 1956—only one week after the United States withdrew funding—in order to help fund the construction of the Aswan High Dam. To compound matters, the Soviet Union took on the responsibility of funding the project and proceeded to strengthen its relationship with the emerging Middle Eastern power. This move increased anxiety in Israel since its neighbor to the south had solidified ties with a bona fide military power. The second excerpt, “Excerpts from President Eisenhower’s Address”, outlined the crisis that ensued. The nationalization of the Suez Canal had angered France and Great Britain, the two nations that primarily benefited from the collection of tolls. Israel was still uneasy due to the armament of Egypt. The result of this tension was the mobilization of French, British, and Israeli military forces. The United States proceeded to address the United Nations regarding the military conflict taking place in Egypt and requested the retreat of military forces in the region. However, the motion was vetoed by France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. After their first attempt had failed, the United States requested that the United Nations General Assembly meet regarding the situation. The tone of Eisenhower’s address was that the United States was seeking stability—mainly for Israel’s sake—in the Middle East, and the Suez Crisis had disrupted the landscape. While Eisenhower succeeded in getting the attention of the United Nations, he also used this address to denounce the use of force by its three allies. The Soviet Union had a different take on the situation in Egypt, as is evident from the third excerpt, “Letter from Premier Bulganin to Eisenhower”. Bulganin suggested that the optimal course of action was for the United States to help stop the war in the Middle East. More specifically, he proposed a collaboration of Soviet and American forces in an effort to put an end to the Suez Crisis. His argument was that since the United States and the Soviet Union were the two superpowers, it was their implied responsibility to keep the peace on Earth. The Soviets felt that cooperation between the superpowers would fortify the United Nations and thus, help maintain peace. This excerpt is evidence of Nikita Kruschev’s “peaceful coexistence” foreign policy towards the United States at the time. It is also an illustration of the Soviet Union’s bias in the Suez Crisis since the central nation involved was a newly established ally. Bulganin’s letter produced only a reply from the White House and no results as the United States refused to intervene militarily. In the fourth excerpt, “White House Statement in Reply to Bulganin’s Letter”, the United States felt that the letter was intended to distract attention from another foreign affairs debacle that the Soviet Union was immersed in, the bloody Hungarian Rebellion of 1956. This excerpt brought to light to the fact that the Red Army was disregarding the rights of Hungarian citizens in a attempt to put a swift end to Imre Nagy’s attempt at liberation from the communist Soviet Union. As for the proposed Soviet-American unification of forces, the United States eliminated that possibility emphatically. Citing the Soviet Union’s lack of compliance of the United Nation’s decisions on the Suez Crisis and the Hungarian Rebellion, the United States made it clear that it would not validate suggestions from the Soviet Union regarding the Suez Crisis. This excerpt teeters on the edge of hyperbole in the way that Soviet “dissention” in the United Nations was portrayed, almost implying that the Soviet Union was against peace in the region. Eventually, it was not the United Nations that put an end to the crisis. French and British military forces withdrew form the region because of the lack of American military intervention. Since the Americans did not deploy any force, the French and British felt that they were at the mercy of the Soviet Union in the region because of its military ties with Nasser and Egypt. Ultimately, this collection of excerpts regarding the Suez Crisis indicates the foreign affairs policies of the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War in the 1950’s. While the Soviet Union was under Kruschev’s rule, their foreign policy towards the United States was one of “peaceful coexistence.” However, the United States tried not to play into this policy. The goal of each nation was to achieve influence in as much of the world as possible in an effort to prevent the spread of the opposing nation’s government ideals. The Middle East was no exception. While these documents on the Suez Crisis may demonstrate the superpowers’ goal of peace in the region, each nation had ulterior motives. Both nations wanted to spread their influence to a region in which they had an interest. Specifically, the United States was concerned with the well being of Israel, while it was also trying to establish diplomatic ties with Arab nations in order to prevent the spread of communism to a region wealthy in natural resources. The United States’ request for Israel to disengage militarily along the Sinai Peninsula as well as their lack of military intervention—which consequently forced the retreat of French and British forces—was viewed favorably by the Arab states. Indirectly, the United States had helped to bring an end to the Suez Crisis. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, had strategic interest in the welfare of Egypt. With Nasser gaining a great deal of respect among Arab nations for nationalizing the Suez Canal, building the Aswan High Dam, and the expulsion of British and French influence, his influence and clout in the region increased. The Soviet Union had hoped that his increased popularity would facilitate the spread of communism to other Arab nations, who were dominated by European powers prior to World War II. The underlying strategy in these excerpts is that neither side was letting on to the fact that the Middle East was a region of interest for both superpowers; rather, they hid their ambitions behind a pursuit of stability in the region. Bibliography:

Word Count: 1298