tions--including but [*19] not limited to the search engine and index--should be analyzed under subsection 512(d). - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - n6 The court need not rule on the applicability of subsection 512(d) to the functions plaintiffs characterize as information location tools because defendant does not rely on subsection 512(d) as grounds for its motion for summary adjudication. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - However, the potential applicability of subsection 512(d) does not completely foreclose use of the 512(a) safe harbor as affirmative defense. See 17 U.S.C. 512(n). The court will now turn to Napster's eligibility for protection under subsection 512(a). It notes at the outset, though, that a ruling that subsection 512(a) applies to a given function would not mean that the DMCA affords the service provider blanket protection. II. Subsection 512(a) Plaintiffs' principal argument against application of the 512(a) safe harbor is that Napster does not perform the passive conduit function eligible for protection under this subsection. As defendant [*20] correctly notes, the words "conduit" or "passive conduit" appear nowhere in 512(a), but are found only in the legislative history and summaries of the DMCA. The court must look first to the plain language of the statute, "construing the provisions of the entire law, including its object and policy, to ascertain the intent of Congress." United States v. Hockings, 129 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 830 (9th Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the statute is unclear, however, the court may rely on the legislative history. See Hockings, 129 F.3d at 1071. The language of subsection 512(a) makes the safe harbor applicable, as a threshold matter, to service providers "transmitting, routing or prov...
