holiday. Humans are always duty bound tosacrificing something for the benefit of others at a given time. Second,utilitarianism can favor unequal distributions of well-being. In particular, itcan impose severe deprivations on the few for the sake of gains for the many.Given its interpretations of impartiality, utilitarianism will count thedeprivations of the few as a moral cost. But, if they produce benefits forenough people, this cost will be outweighed. Even a severe inequality can bebalanced out and approved of by a utilitarian.Some philosophers, feeling the force of these objections, have proposedreplacing utilitarianism about future generations with an egalitarian view.This view cares not just about the sum of benefits across generations, but alsoabout their equitable distribution. We do not sacrifice the worst-offgeneration for better-off generations, but aim at equality of conditions amongthem. This egalitarian view can take many forms, but a good version has beenproposed by Brian Barry. He says that each generation has a duty to pass on toits successors a total range of resources and opportunities that is at least asgood as its own.[1] Those generations that enjoy favorable conditions of lifemust pass on similar circumstances of life to their future. However,generations that are less fortunate have no such stringent obligations. What isrequired of each generation is that it just pass on a total package ofopportunities that is comparable to its own; whatever the exact composition ofthat package may be. Barry's approach to the egalitarian view can easily beinterpreted as an ethic of outcomes. Assuming this interpretation, is theegalitarian view the best of our duty concerning future generations? Thereseems to be one major objection against Berry's view.Brian Barry's egalitarian view does not place excessive demands on earlygenerations to make sacrifices for the sake of later generations. That isbecause it places no ...
