the only one possible." Furthermore, as the meeting came to a close a flabbergasted Molotov responded, "I have never been talked to like that in my life." (19) Collectively, these quotes leave little doubt that Truman embraced a new policy of strict bluntness and a willingness to "play hardball" with the Russians. While it is fairly clear that Truman embraced a new hard-line policy it is highly controversial whether Truman took this policy one step farther. The "revisionist" historian Alperovitz claims that Truman made a conscious effort to postpone the Potsdam meeting until the atomic bomb could be tested, which he calls the "strategy of a delayed showdown."(20) In this way, Truman would be able to intimidate the Russians and gain the political upper hand, or as Secretary of State Byrnes told Truman the bomb could, "put us in a position to dictate our own terms at the end of the war."(21) On 16 May 1945 Stimson told President Truman that, "We shall probably hold more cards in our hands later than now," and supposedly urged him to adopt the policy of delay.(22) Although Alperovitz himself admits that many of the details are missing from Truman's meetings with his advisors, it nonetheless becomes extremely difficult to believe Truman and Stimson's claim that the only reason the bomb was dropped was for military reasons. There exists evidence in Truman's diaries and letters to his wife that seems to contradict Alperovitz's revisionist theory of American diplomacy concerned with using the bomb to intimidate the Russians.(23) The first entry of note is from 7 June 1945, slightly more than a month before the inception of the Potsdam Conference. On that day Truman wrote: "I'm not afraid of Russia. They've always been our friends and I can't see any reason why they shouldn't always be."(24) This feeling expressed by Truman of what seems like sincere desire for a friendship is reinforced in Truman's gratitude towards Harry Hopkins, whom he sen...
