serious dangers of insufficient coordination, as the travesty at the Bay of Pigs soon showed and Johnson was unfortunate to inherit it.4 Lyndon Johnson had many vital decisions to make when he was in office. The fragmented NSC was not an efficient instrument since he had to conclude whether or not to continue supporting Vietnam militarily and economically.Our large-scale military entry into the Vietnam War in early 1965 reflected the piecemeal consideration of interrelated issues, and that this was the natural consequence of a fragmented NSC and a general inattention to long-range policy planning. Consultation, even knowledge of the basic facts, was confined to a tight circle of presidential advisors,and there appears to have been little systematic debate outside that group.5The White-House was primarily for action or reaction and not a place for reflective thought on difficult long-term problems, this was a result for an absence of comprehensive policy analysis.6 The Policy Planning Staff, during the years of 1961- 1966 tried to figure out a possible solution through the National Policy Papers. These papers set down responsible lines of policy for the U.S. government to follow. Apparently, the principal department heads, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, were unwilling to spend the personal time required to reach any agreement and furthermore, no one would take the time to read or endorse the Papers. The general inattention to long-range policy planning is demonstrated by the decisions and actions that marked the largescale military entry into the Vietnam War in early 1965 which reflected the piecemeal consideration of interrelated issues.7The United States was determined that bombing North Vietnam was a tactic of maintaining the conflict within boundaries. Hanoi was believed to surrender shortly after bombing and during the pauses, negotiations would take place. North Vietnam was convinced that bom...
