ins a legacy of the postwar order" (51). Since the unification of Germany was accomplished through accession, it meant, strangely enough, that neither West nor East Germany had a say in the other's decision on whether to form a unified state or what conditions such a unification would be contingent upon, respectively. Put simply, the net effect of the extension of the Basic Law to all of Germany did not guarantee the implementation of a new joint governing policy or a new constitution for the country. It seemed, as a result of some esoteric articles of the Basic Law, that the GDR would cease to exist legally and the FRG would survive. It was impossible to draw the conclusion that both would die out and be replaced by a new political identity. Many of the Federal Republic's laws immediately applied in the GDR (Gloebner 153). Article 146 of the Basic Law, put simply, allowed for the annulment of the Basic Law, to be replaced with another governing system, without previously binding the people to any specific rules. Seemingly, it sanctions revolution, and, "as proved to be the case in 1990, this is not a purely theoretical conclusion" (Preuss 52). Some suggest that, by unifying through accession, Germany has made problems which could end up overshadowing the benefits of unification. The suggestion is that the implementation of a constitution by a society without experience in utilizing it, without the necessary institutions and without the corresponding value system will bring about more harm than good (politically). The imposition of the Basic Law was the root for much of the mistrust between East and West Germans following unification. In regards to the East Germans, the Law was effectively self-imposed, and "neither submission nor voluntary self-submission is likely to engender the social and political coherence which is a necessary condition for a stable democracy" (Preuss 54). In regards to the...
