the Viet Cong would take over the villagers, and southern troops would be killed every time they passed through. Khiem recalls an example, “The Australians fighting for the Americans were smart. They were some of the best fighters. They would come into a village and then leave, but about 20 of them stayed. At night when the Viet Cong came in, they were met by US fire and eliminated. But the Viet Cong are smart too. They began to adapt, and got the village women and children to counts troops when they entered. If the same number of troops did not leave, the villagers knew there were troops that stayed back. Soon the soldiers staying back were all killed in the night, too. So how can you possibly prevent this? The strategic hamlet was the only alternative. Diem had to make sure all contacts with Viet Cong were cut off from the people. The proof that it worked was that the Viet Cong started to attack the hamlets. They would never openly divulge themselves unless they had no other alternative.” The logic in this argument deserves merit. The hamlet was designed so no communist could come in contact with the villagers, and thus making it harder for Viet Cong to know what US troops were doing. However, failure of the hamlet was partly caused by relocation of villagers, so Khiem’s argument must be considered only speculative. When asked why Diem’s regime failed, Khiem says that it was a combination of the lack of understanding on the part of the Americans and even the citizens of Vietnam about who the VietCong were and how they operated: “The Viet Cong are hardly criticized when we read and watch TV about Vietnam. The answer why is because no one really know them, except for Diem, his family and the people that migrated from Bac to Nam in 1954-56. We saw how they tried to convince us to join them. They come in to our houses at night and threatened us of painful death. The only people that they trusted are the poor...
