ng the existence of the axioms denies the very axioms needed to make the challenging question have any meaning. Certainly, there is no dispute that those axioms underlie the question as well as the answer. At the very least, a question cannot be a question at all if there is no distinction between each of the words in the question. My defense of the axioms indeed makes use of the axioms, but it is impossible to do otherwise, and it is impossible to ask a question without supposing those same axioms. To ask whether it is proper to suppose so is the same as saying, "I cannot conceive otherwise, but it still may not exist." That clearly, as we have seen, amounts to incoherence.Then, it should follow that the rational is the real and the real is the rational. This is simply restating what I have shown in the prior two paragraphs. If my conception is necessary, then not only may I not conceive otherwise but also may I not question the existence of the concept. To do so would result in contradiction. The conceptual is the rational, and it amounts to the real. A problem remains, however, concerning necessary existential propositions. Kant had denied that existence could be a "real predicate." What this means is that existence was not the real attribute of something. The reason that this is a problem is that it poses a problem in logic with the word "exist." There is a paradox that results, if existence is a predicate, in talking about the non-existence of something. The reader may recall a dubious sense when he or she read the definition of an "impossible being." Does not saying of something that it exists result in absurdity if we consider the case of a being lacking that predicate? For example:For every value of x which does not have the predicate of existence, then x (exists). It would seem that there would exist an x that did not exist. If that is the case, then necessary existential propositions are absurd because they could not be unders...
