lack the predicate do "exist" in another sense, that being that they exist in relation to real objects—they are an expression of what those real objects are not. There is no logical difficulty if one recognizes that. Rather than defeating the ontological argument, what this sort of objection does is bring to light the confusion there is in all the different ways people speak about "existence." This does not mean that there are not distinctions that can be made.St. Anselm probably could not have recognized what a stir his argument would make amongst philosophers. I doubt he could have foreseen that there would be some who would claim that existential propositions could not be necessary. The absurdities that come from this line of objection allow us to understand why it probably did not occur to Anselm. It would be somewhat similar if I stated, "There were men on the moon in 1969" and for someone to tell me that could not be the case because the moon is in Chicago and 1969 is in Pittsburgh. I could not anticipate such objections, and my argument on its own could not answer them. The difference between the two absurdities is that one is more obviously absurd at first thought than the other. Nevertheless, both are absurd, and one should not be expected to dream up all the infinitely absurd objections that exist. How is one supposed to anticipate such absurdity? The argument that existential propositions cannot be necessary is an argument that depends upon the existence of at least one thing necessarily (that there is a law of noncontradiction) even to make the argument, and furthermore is based on the mistaken notion that contingency does not depend upon necessity. Finally, existence can be understood conceptually as a predicate despite the logical confusion that Kant and others have tried to introduce. There is meaningfulness in necessary existential propositions, and therefore ontological argument can stand against the objections ra...
