jections of Kant and Russell on its own. It assumes, whether justifiably or not, that there can be such a thing as a necessarily existing being, that such a being is possible, and that is unreasonable to presume that all things which exist might be contingent.So, our question remains whether existential propositions can be necessary propositions. Neither Kant nor Russell adequately show why existential propositions cannot be necessary propositions, but unless one can show why they can be, one might as well agree with the spirit of Kant and Russell. If something cannot be shown to be necessary, then it remains merely contingent in the mind of the subject. In fact, one must wonder whether it would be appropriate to ask for a proof of the contingency position. For instance, if Kant and Russell could conclusively demonstrate that all existential propositions are contingent, then the proposition, "Necessary propositions necessarily do not exist" would follow from the argument. That is, there would exist one proposition necessarily which could rationally claim that it did not exist. Although some may deny that even the proposition "Necessary propositions necessarily do not exist" existed, this proposition would likely make their position self-contradictory. Therefore, one should not be too disappointed with Kant’s and Russell’s positions as they are likely as consistent as they can be. Later, though the consistency of the position shall be called into question.So, the burden is in showing that there must be necessary existential propositions. To that end, one must look at the nature of contingency and necessity. Here we come in contact with another argument for the existence of God, that being the cosmological argument, specifically the cosmological argument that deals with contingency and necessity.Of all philosophers, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz most adequately expresses why there cannot be a universe only of contingency. Leibniz ...
