that are most reliable at generating "epistemically virtuous states" in human beings in our world; and (d) almost nothing is knowable a priori. No epistemological principles are knowable a priori. Please submit B. What kind of naturalism is Husserl against? It is important to be clear, I think, that Husserl is not against any and every philosophical position that calls itself naturalism. After all, labels and -isms don't themselves matter. What is at issue is the content of the doctrines in questions. Thus for instance Husserl has no objection to TN -- to take a simple case. More substantively, he can (at least in the context of the Logos Manifesto) grant MN. His quarrel with naturalism here is not a quarrel with physicalism. Prejudice in Philosophy: Remarks, Conjectures & Confessions Intentionality concerns the phenomena at the center of consciousness, at its focus. At the periphery of consciousness is what Husserl termed the "horizon," the background that provides the conditions for comprehending phenomena. In other words, what the horizon provides is pre-understanding (Vorverstndnis). For instance, we understand the meaning of words in the context of a horizon constituted from our understanding of other words and their relations. Describing the relationships between horizon and intentionality, Husserl points out: Consciousness--where the given object is led to its realization--is not like a box with data inside. A current state of consciousness is constituted so that every object shows its selfness.12 Heidegger uses a notion similar to Husserl's horizon: readiness-to-hand (Zuhanden). The word Zuhanden--at hand--emphasizes that relevant objects are held near the focus of consciousness. Both horizon and intentional states are constantly changing, and a phenomenon placed at the horizon, in the background, can be readily moved to the center by consciousness. Conversely, the phenomena constituted in the field of intentionality form a par...
