nsisted in the constant conjunction of the cause and its effect, then even if consciousness were only naturally supervenient, in our world it would always be present in the right circumstances; hence, it would be a part of the cause of whatever behavior follows it. But there are problems for any such view of causation which Chalmers does not want his theory to depend on. Imagine the case of identical twins and their hair color. Just because in all cases the second twin born has the same hair color as the first, this does not mean that the first twin caused the second twin's hair color to be what it is.(4) Chalmers could also argue that our behavior is causally overdetermined; that is, although purely physical phenomena are enough to cause all of our behavior, consciousness also causes it, so that our behavior is overdetermined. But neither of these views capture our common sense intuitions about the nature of causation and how phenomenal states are responsible for our actions. Indeed, Chalmers rejects both of these possibilities. Chalmers seems to accept the fact that on his theory "experience is superfluous in the explanation of behavior, whether or not it has some subtle causal relevance" (Chalmers 159). The strongest worry which this brings up for dualist theories has to do with what Chalmers calls phenomenal judgments. Phenomenal judgments are those judgments we make about our phenomenal states. How could the actual experience of a phenomenal state play no role in the forming of such a judgment? Chalmers devotes an entire chapter to this problem, but in my opinion he merely avoids the issue and tries to convince us that our strong intuitions that consciousness cannot be epiphenomenal are not good reasons for rejecting his theory. He states: "Epiphenomenalism may be counterintuitive, but it is not obviously false, so if a sound argument forces it on us, we should accept it. Of course, a counterintuitive conclusion may give us reason ...
