is something it is like to see an apple (as opposed to seeing nothing), only that what is really going on in our heads does not add up to the mysterious thing called "consciousness" which Chalmers worries about. Dennett's stance is clearly adamant: "The time has come to put the burden of proof squarely on those who persist in using the term. The philosophical sense of the term is simply ridiculous" (Dennett 405). Dennett and other eliminativists argue that everything philosophers call consciousness is really just a bunch of complex interactions between brain states, sensory input, and motor output occurring within our heads. The motivation behind his claim is that these sorts of things are exactly what Chalmers attributes to zombies. Regardless of whether conceiving of a zombie would cause you to think of yourself as one, a materialist would be hard pressed to come up with an inconsistency in the logical possibility of zombies. (2) Because zombies are logically possible, consciousness cannot logically supervene on the physical. Consider Chalmers and his zombie twin: there is a high-level difference between themthe zombie lacks all conscious experienceand yet all of their low-level physical properties are the same. Therefore, the high-level property of being conscious cannot be logically supervenient on physical properties. There is some room for argument here, and Chalmers considers possible ways of denying this premise: "An opponent might agree that nothing in this sort of physics entails the existence of consciousness, but argue that there might be a new kind of physical theory from which consciousness falls out as a consequence." He continues, "The trouble is that the basic elements of physical theories seem always to come down to two things: structure and dynamics of physical processes. . . . But from structure and dynamics, we can only get more structure and dynamics . . . conscious experience will remain untouched" (Chalmers 118)....
