Critique on Thomas Nagels What it is like to be a bat? The mind-body problem has troubled philosophers for centuries. This is because no human being has been able to sufficiently explain how the mind actually works and how this mind relates to the body most importantly to the brain. If this were not true then there would not be such heated debates on the subject. No one objects to the notion that the Earth revolves around the sun because it is empirical fact. However, there is no current explanation on the mind that can be accepted as fact. In What is it like to be a bat?, Thomas Nagel does not attempt to solve this problem. Instead, he attempts to reject the reductionist views with his argument on subjectivity. He examines the difficulties of the mind-body problem by investigating the conscious experience of an organism, which is usually ignored by the reductionists. Unfortunately, his arguments contain some flaws but they do shed some light as to why the physicalist view may never be able to solve the mind-body problem.In What is it like to be a bat?, Nagel attempts to distinguish between objective and subjective conscious experience. He begins his paper by explaining how consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem intractable (p. 534) and why reductionists must use this in order to come to a true conclusion about the mind. He uses the what is it like to be a bat example to support this argument because he wants to prove that the mind has a subjective aspect to it. However, this argument already begins with a flaw. This argument presupposes that a bat is a thinking, conscious being. He even states this prior to the bat example when he states Conscious experience is a widespread phenomenon. It occurs at many levels of animal life . . ., and then he goes on to state, We may call this the subjective character of experience. But we cannot presuppose this because of the mere fact that we DO NOT know what it is like ...
