Gods omnipotence, Philosophy, College Term Papers.com


		Data Bases
		• Custom Term Papers • Free Term Papers • Free Research Papers • Free Essays • Free Book Reports • Plagiarism?

		Links
		• Top 100 Term Paper Sites • Top 25 Essay Sites • Top 50 Essay Sites • Search 97,000 Papers @ DirectEssays.com • Search 101,000 Papers @ ExampleEssays.com • Search 90,000 Papers @ MegaEssays.com

		Free Essays
		• Term Paper Sites • Chuck III's Free Essays • Free College Essays • TermPaperSites.com • My Term Papers • Get Free Essays • Essay World • Planet Papers

Search Lots of Essays

Back to Subjects - Philosophy

Gods omnipotence

Gods omnipotence The theological problem of evil is a problem that many philosophers have tried to solve. The problem is stated as, “if one believes that god is omnipotent and wholly good, why does evil still exist?” In this writing I will discuss the solutions/propositions of John L. Mackie in his work, “Evil and Omnipotence.” I will do this in order to illustrate the concept of free will for understanding or resolving the problem, and to reveal how and why Mackie arrives at his conclusions. In the beginning of Mackie’s work he writes a brief introduction to fully expose the problem of evil, and to set guidelines for determining whether or not the problem applies to one. Mackie states that in his work one must be prepared to believe, not only what cannot be proved, but also what can be proven wrong from other beliefs one has. From this Mackie moves on to describe that the problem applies only to individual’s who believe that there is a God who is omnipotent and wholly good. Mackie sets this guideline in order to eliminate the acceptions of individual’s that the problem will not apply to. Now that Mackie has set the guideline to test whether the problem is applicable, he states the problem of evil in what he calls its ‘simplest form.’ Mackie states the problem as; God is omnipotent, God is wholly good, and evil still exists. The problem with the phrase is that all three propositions cannot exist collectively. One can choose only two and it would cause the third to be false. Now that Mackie is nearing the end of his introduction he sets some rules concerning the terms ‘good,’ ‘evil,’ and ‘omnipotent.’ Mackie states that good is opposed to evil in a way that good always eliminates evil as best as it can and that there are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do. Therefore, Mackie exposes that a good omnipotent being will eliminate evil entirely, and the proposition that a good omnipotent being exists while evil still exists is not possible. At this point in Mackies work he is reaching the end of the introduction and is going to proceed to his next section, ‘Adequate Solutions.’ The Adequate Solutions section is used by Mackie to show how some individual’s adopt solutions to the problem of evil that will conclude by proving inconsistent. In this section Mackie first exposes that there is a large number of adequate solutions to the problem of evil. He then provides examples of some of these solutions. One of the adequate solution examples that he states is that, some individuals use the term ‘omnipotence’ while severely restricting its meaning. Mackie then provides another example of how some believe that evil is merely a lack of that which is good, and that evil which opposes good does not exist. Mackie uses these examples of Adequate Solutions to show that if one adopts any of these solutions, then one will not be able to full realize the problem of evil. Now that Mackie has shown that Adequate Solutions will not prove to be sufficient solutions for the problem of evil, he moves to the next section, ‘Fallicious Solutions.’ This section is where the solutions to the problem of evil will prove applicable but fallacious through argument. Mackie explains that he will be trying to consider whether or not it is possible to arrive at an adequate solution by modifying parts of each solution. The solution that Mackie lists first is solution (i) “Good cannot exist without evil” or “Evil is necessary as a counterpart to good.” Mackie explains this solution by stating, if there were no evil then there will be no good. One will not know how good and evil differ if there is no evil. This, to Mackie, shows that either God is not omnipotent or there are some limits to what an omnipotent being can do. Mackie takes into consideration the reply that “omnipotence has never meant the power to do what is logically impossible.” He takes this reply into consideration because it does not reject what is necessary to theism, but Mackie states that he will discuss it later in his work. Mackie then discusses theists that believe God can do what is logically impossible. Mackie explains that many of these theists believe that God creates logic. This view of logic proves inconsistent unless God is bound by logical necessities. This possibility of God being able to bind himself is what Mackie calls the Paradox of Omnipotence. The Paradox of Omnipotence is something that Mackie also explains later in his work. Now that Mackie has finished explaining that the solution set a limit to what God can do he exposes that the solution denies that evil is opposed to good. Mackie goes on to explain that possibly one may be using ‘good’ and ‘evil’ the same way as ‘great’ and ‘small.’ Mackie states that ‘great’ and ‘small’ are words that may be used as counterparts, yet they cannot be used as set features for anything. This comparison is done to explain that ‘great’ and ‘small’ can exist without each other. Mackie states that there would be no logical impossibility in everything being small or great. From this he proceeds to use another analogy to show how ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are used in a way so that they do not oppose each other. The example he uses is redness. Mackie explains that the only way we know that something is red is because of the things that are not red. Without the non-red things, one would never have noticed the red things. He then explains that it is common to give names to qualities if they have an opposite. With this fact at hand, the rule that good cannot exist without evil would not be logical. Now Mackie is near the end of solution (i) and he states that the solution would be satisfactory only if it were to say “ Evil exists, but only enough to serve as the counterpart to good.” This unreasonable solution is something that theists would not agree with. Now Mackie moves to solution (ii) which states, “Evil is necessary as a means to good.” In this solution one is using the word means versus counterpart. This solution is not sufficient because of its restriction on God’s power. It’s restriction exists because it implies that you cannot have ‘good’ without a certain mean (evil). Mackie spends little time on this solution by concluding that this solution only solves the problem of evil by denying Gods omnipotence. At this point in his work, Mackie moves to solution (iii). Solution (iii) states, “The universe is better with some evil in it than it could be if there were no evil.” Mackie explains that the solution may be developed by either an aesthetic analogy, or by the fact that the gradual overcoming of good over evil, is better than un-challenged good. Yet, he combines the two by a starting point. He explains this starting point as the assumption that, pain, gives rise to physical evil. He then develops this starting point by exposing that ‘good’ and ‘evil’ as well as ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’ can go hand in hand. Mackie calls pain and misery first order evil. He then calls pleasure and happiness first order good. From these he arrives at a second order good that he says emerges from first order evil. This second order good is suppose to be more important than both first order good and evil because, it outweighs first order evil. Now that Mackie has established the good and evil orders, he reveals that using these orders is the best way to approach the solution because it includes a second order good and yet admits that there is a first order evil. At this point in the work Mackie questions whether good and evil are opposed. He states that they do not clearly oppose each other, but first order good contrasts with first order evil and they are both opposed by second order good (benevolence). Mackie then goes on to say that God’s goodness is more like a third order good, or the will to maximize the second order good. Mackie now moves to explain the objections to this solution. The first one is that possibly second and third order goods are means to first order goods. This he reveals is inconsistent because it would now make sense for God to keep misery in existence just to have things like benevolence. The second objection reveals that God is not benevolent or sympathetic nor is he concerned about minimizing first order evil. It says that he simply tries to promote second order good. Mackie now moves to the fatal objection/objection three. This objection considers a second order evil which would contrast with a second order good in the same way a first order evil contrasts with a first order good. This second order evil would be the same kind of evil that God, if he were wholly good and omnipotent, would eliminate. The ironic part of this objection is that second order evils plainly exist. Now Mackie is nearing the end of solution (iii) and he makes an attempt to use the solution in a different way. Mackie explains that since there is a third order good, there could be a third order evil. This Mackie states in order to express the pattern heading toward an infinite regress. Solution (iv) is the solution involving free will. This solution states, “Evil is due to human free will.” The solution assigns the problem of evil to human actions rather than to God. This assignment of free will leads to the question of why a wholly good God gave men free will knowing that it would eventually lead to a decision of evil. Mackie thinks that solution (iv) is unsatisfactory. He states that if God made individuals with the will to do good and bad, then why did he not make them will only good. Then Mackie goes on to express that some think wrong choices are necessary for freedom (free will). This objection then proceeds to the problem with two different types of freedom. One of the freedoms is the third order good. The other is the ‘random’ decision making that takes place by humans (free will). The second freedom takes away the responsibility of making men freely choose the good decision from God. From this fact, Mackie states that God’s omnipotence is no longer valid if men are really free. He then exposes that it is possible that God can control individuals wills butt that he just refrains from doing so. Mackie takes this problem into consideration and moves to an important part of his work called the Paradox of Omipotence. This paradox questions whether a powerful (omnipotent) being can make things that he cannot control. The reason this paradox is important is because if of the answers. If one answer’s ‘Yes,’ that God can make things which he cannot control, then one is denying him omnipotence because there would be things that he cannot do. If one answers ‘No,’ that god cannot make things that bind himself, then again one is denying God the power to do everything (omnipotence). After Mackie fully states the Paradox, he moves to a possible objection. The objection is for an individual to build a machine (which has no free will) and determine how it will behave. This determination does not work because the individual only determines the machines actions and does not know for sure what it will do. God, on the other hand, is supposed to know all and be omnipotent. Therefore, he should be able to control human actions. Now that Mackie has made the Paradox clear he tries to suggest solutions. He attempts solutions by distinguishing first order omnipotence (unlimited power to control all) from second order omnipotence (the unlimited power to determine what powers something will have, which there after he cannot control). Mackie exposes that if God has first order omnipotence, then no beings truly have the will to act freely of God. After that, Mackie states that if God has second order omnipotence then he assigned free will to beings and he cannot now control them (defies first order omnipotence). From these distinctions Mackie comes to the end of solution (iv) and states that the only way to avoid the paradox would be to deny God as a continuing being. By doing this it eliminates the free will solution of evil and leads Mackie to his conclusion. Mackie concludes his work by stating that through all the examined solutions there were none that proved to solve the problem of evil. He then states that there may be others to examine, but they will still lead to an invalid solution. After Mackies obvious conclusion that there is not a solution to the problem of evil he comments about the Paradox of Omnipotence. Mackie puts forth the questionability of whether God can be attributed to time at all, in which leads one to question whether omnipotence can be attributed to God at all. Bibliography:

Word Count: 2203