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This gives rise to what Kant calls a natural dialectic—a tendency to indulge in plausible arguments which contradict one another, and in this way to undermine the claims of duty. This may be disastrous to morality in practice, so disastrous that in the end ordinary human reason is to be found only in philosophy, and in particular in a critique of practical reason, which will trace our moral principle to its source in reason itself.” “A reviewer who wanted to find some fault with this work has hit the truth better, perhaps, than he thought, when he says that no new principle of morality is set forth in it, but only a new formula. But who would think of introducing a new principle of all morality, and making himself as it were the first discoverer of it, just as if all the world before him were ignorant what duty was or had been in thoroughgoing error? But whoever knows of what importance to a mathematician a formula is… will not think that a formula is insignificant and useless which does the same for all duty in general.” The Categorical Imperative has been the subject of debate since Kant first wrote his moral works. Philosopher’s have argued as to what Kant intended its true meaning(s) are and what the problems with these various definitions are. In the 20th Century there has been a significant rejection of the ‘traditional’ view of Kant’s Categorical Imperative. Leading this movement was Paton, Duncan and Williams. More recently joining the debate was Gregor, a student of Paton’s. These writers, while they may not agree on exactly how many possible definitions there are for the Categorical Imperative, they each see that there is definitely more than one conception of this term. This essay will explore the diverging and common aspects of these scholars’ positions and then explain my own interpretation of Kant. One reason why the Categorical Imperative has so many and such varied definitions derives from the fact that it is referred to in several of Kant’s works, most notably the Groundwork (ooo……). Scholars argue over which work should take precedent in defining the categorical imperative. Generally the later works take precedent as they can be seen as refining earlier definitions but there is also criticism of them. For example, Gregor argues that “the Metaphysik der Sitten is a hurriedly written and, in fact, unfinished work.” The struggle to arrive at precise and reasonable definitions of the categorical imperative is driven by the possible implications that each definition has. The subtle distinctions between definitions of the imperative have significant and far reaching implications for morality. Paton is one of the most frequently referred to writers on the subject of the Categorical imperative. His work represents an original investigation into the meaning of the Categorical Imperative. Paton describes the categorical imperative in five senses. These sense of the categorical imperative are: 1) The Formula of Universal Law 1a) The Law of Nature II) End in Itself III) Autonomy IIIa) Kingdom of Ends Another notable writer on this subject is Duncan. Duncan explains that there are not as many definitions of the categorical imperative as proposed by Paton. Instead he recognizes only the first four of Paton’s. He arrives at this conclusion by asking how many senses of the imperative Kant intended to there to be and how many formula’s can we pull out? Duncan’s answer to his first question is that “Kant himself appears to speak as if there were only three:” Two passages of the groundwork suggest that Kant himself intended there to be three subsidiary principles and the supreme moral principle. The three subsidiary formulas Ia, II, and IIIa are seen to be “logically equivalent” in the context of the whole. These formulas are subsidiary and are derived from the supreme principle. The common element to both Formula I and III is that they are devoid of any teleological considerations. There are no references to objects or ends of the action within these formulations. “Autonomy is the sole principle of ethics” This would suggest that Formula III and not Formula I is the supreme moral principle. What is the distinction and difference that allows us to make this assessment? Paton includes the Formula of the Law of Autonomy as an imperative, but Duncan argues that this is wrong. Duncan replies that although Kant does formulate the Principle of Autonomy in terms of an imperative, it does not add meaning in a significant way to Formula I. Paton’s argument is that Formula III is markedly different from Formula I and so needs to be recognized as its own version of the imperative. Paton suggests that if rational nature were merely subject to a universal law, then it could not be free. Instead we need the Formula of autonomy, the rational nature must also be the legislator of the law, for freedom and subsequently morality to be possible. Williams and Duncan disagree. They argue that the importance of the principle of autonomy lies exclusively in its function as stating fundamental presupposition of morality. This presupposition, upon which the Categorical Imperative itself must rest. (Diagram, p.36). After settling the various notions of what the categorical imperative is, Williams turns his attention to how the Categorical Imperative, in terms of Formula I, is traditionally understood. He summarizes Ewing’s position as: 1) the act is determined by its motive 2) the maxim is formulated without reference to material ends and 3) the categorical imperative can be used as a test for moral value of actions. The traditional interpretation says that the self-consistency of a maxim determines its worth without consideration of any objects or ends. However this has lead to some very mistaken interpretations. If a maxim is logically self-consistent when universalized, does that automatically generate an ‘ought’ that it must be done? The clear answer is no. This would lead to a ridiculous position that would entail everything from breathing to sleeping to have a positive moral value. Instead, we should look at the categorical imperative in terms of its ability as a negative test. The universalizing of a maxim certainly rejects any wrong maxims but it need not generate an oughtness to any maxims that pass. Rather, we should use the categorical imperative as a negative test for what is prohibited and what is not prohibited. In each of Kant’s examples, we see either that the universalized maxim creates a contradiction or its opposite entails a contradiction. For example “could I indeed say to myself that every one may make a false promise when he finds himself in a difficulty he can get out of in no other way? Then I soon become aware that I could indeed will the lie, but by no mean a universal law to lie;” It is traditionally accepted that the opposite of these leads to contradiction so they are duties. Some commentators describe Kant’s attempt to use the Categorical Imperative practically as a mistake made in the early stages of his exposition. Kant insists in several places in his doctrine that the imperative must be categorical and not hypothetical. How can we reconcile this? Each of these propositions involve a “concealed reference” to ends. As Caird puts it “it is not the case that maxims of such acts are contradictory when universalized, so much as they are contradictory with a certain presupposed order in the life of rational beings. Lying and stealing contradict the matenaince of truth and private property, respectively. The second two examples also cannot help but refer to end in some kind of way. But isn’t Kant really using the Formula Ia, not Formula I, in these examples? He makes no fewer than five references to the law/system of nature in the relevant paragraph in the Groundwork. “He now applies the test ‘Can the maxim of my action really become a universal law of nature?’… The only further question to ask is whether this principle of self-love can become a universal law of nature. It is then seen at once that a system of nature… would contradict itself and consequently could not subsist as a system of nature. Hence this maxim cannot possibly hold as a universal law of nature…” (Although in Gregor’s edition the wording is slightly different and leads to less numerous and explicit references). And again in the second, third and fourth examples his references are also to the ‘law of nature’ and not to the purely formal categorical imperative. So, it seems clear that Kant is using the subsidiary principle of the law of nature with reference to an end. “Some actions are so constituted that their maxim cannot even be conceived as a universal law of nature without contradiction, let alone be willed as what ought to become one. In the case of others we do not find this inner impossibility, but it is still impossible to will that their maxim should be raised to the universality of a law of nature, because such a will would contradict itself.” ..gr.p.91 In this latter passage Kant seems to be referring to maxims which have a logical contradiction within them. While the examples of promise keeping and suicide do seem to have a logical contradiction within them when universalized, they do not have as inheirent a problem as Kant seems to hold. The Categorical Imperative is contrasted with Hypothetical Imperatives. Hypothetical Imperatives are used to base our actions in terms of their results and have no place within Kant’s system of ethics. The hypothetical imperative determines an action to be practically necessary as a means to the attainment of something outside of the action itself, whereas the categorical imperative determines an action to be objectively necessary in itself apart from any relationship to future ends. If an action is good solely in its means to acquire something else, then it is hypothetical. Then we must ask if these are laws which govern rational beings, rather than if we are aiming at ends. The proposed solution is that we allow the ‘system of nature’ to guide the purely formal principle of the categorical imperative in its practical application. The danger with appealing to the law of nature is that we make quickly find ourselves more concerned with the ends of our actions and lose sight of the objective moral law which allows for our morality to take place. Within the traditional interpretation of Kant is the strain dealing with “Rigorism”. Kant’s insistence on intent justifying some extreme conclusions, especially concerning the topic of lying. “Kant argues that if a man speaks nothing but the truth he is not responsible for the consequences, even though these involve the probable murder of an innocent man; whereas if he tells a lie, no matter from what motive, he at once makes himself answerable for every result of his falsehood, however unforeseen.” However this position on lying does not logically follow from his overall theory. Rather, Kant seems to be on a personal mission that borders on an obsession with this position. To presume that lying under any circumstance is morally wrong, does not follow simply because of the validity of the maxim “I will never lie”. This is because there is a large, if not infinite number of maxims which can be formulated with differing degrees of generality. A man may adopt the maxims “I will only lie if I anticipate grave consequences from telling the truth” or “I will lie only if I can save a life in doing so”. It does not seem possible that the maxim “I will never lie” contradicts these maxims that give reference to ends. Ross gives a strong retort to Kant’s position by asking why we would not use the maxim that “I will lie to would-be murderers”? Surely we would not be helping society more if we adopted maxims for such circumstances than if we told the truth unconditionally. Williams suggest that Kant’s own personal views on lying corrupts his arguments here and that this conclusion does not follow from his general theory of ethics. Returning to Paton’s conception of Kant’s formalism, we find new hope to resolve some of the initial difficulties raised by the traditional interpretation. One of the traditional difficulties raised was the dichotomy between actions of motivated by duty and actions motivated by inclination and desire. However, upon investigation it seems obvious that Kant does not deserve this extreme position which has frequently been associated with him. As Paton points out, it is perfectly legitimate for both duty and inclination to be motives, side by side, for the same action. It is a distortion of Kant’s philosophy to say that we cannot have inclination at the same time as duty for our action to be considered good. The second part of this issue raised by the traditional position, is how the formal categorical imperative, which gives no reference to ends, can be used as the determining principle for moral action. Paton argues that Kant’s doctrine argues that ends and consequences cannot form the determining ground for moral action. Paton argues that Kant realizes that duty aims for certain ends, but the ends are not the determining ground for the moral value of the action. As Paton puts it “A good man aims at consequences because of the law: he does not obey the law merely because of the consequences… If Kant had said merely that we must not allow our desires for particular consequences to determine our judgement of what our duty is, he would have avoided a great deal of misunderstanding.” The fallacy of the traditional argument lies in its confusion of “material ends” and “material maxims” with the content and matter that must be included in every maxim. All maxims must contain some reference to ends but this is quite separate from the question of what the motive is. Questioning if the motive contains a material end within it is a separate question from what end the maxim contains. By developing such an interpretation of Kant’s doctrine Paton is able to form an original position on how the categorical imperative is to be seen as a purely formal or a priori principle. An important point of Paton’s is that by saying judgements are a priori we do not mean that we make them before experience occurs. It is central to Kant’s philosophy in general that all knowledge comes with experience. Kant’s point, according to Paton, is that moral judgements have both ‘form’ and ‘matter’, or ‘a priori’ and ‘a posteriori’ elements. In considering a judgement our task is to separate out the elements and decide from the formal aspect if the action is in accordance with morality. In Paton’s view every action must have a ‘material end’ or ‘intention’, as well as a motive. But the motive of a moral act must come from the principle of the universal law, namely duty. The next question we put to Paton is ‘how is the Supreme Principle of Morality practically useful?’. Paton makes several references to Kant’s initial point that he is not setting forth to discover a new principle of morality, so much as he is developing a formula of morality. Paton describes the categorical imperative, in the sense of Formula I, as the ‘universal ethical command’ which bids us to act in accordance with duty. Further he sees it as the test or criterion of both moral goodness and moral action. His position on this question is grounded in his view that the categorical imperative is the principle of pure practical reason, the moral motive. The practical use of the categorical imperative is further detailed by Paton in his distinctions between Formulas I and III, and the subsidiary formulas. The former are ‘superior’ in that they contain no reference to ends and are concerned solely with the motive and hence the moral value of actions. “The superiority of Formula I and still more with Formula III—lies in its insistence that action is morally good in virtue These scholars also debate as to whether or not the supreme principle is practical. Alternatively, are the subsidiary principles practical? Or is it only the subjective principles created by the agent that are practical? Paton and Duncan differ on this issue as well, but according to Williams, their differences are not insurmountable. We must begin with duty- the a priori part of ethics, assuming we are able to divide ethics into a priori and empirical considerations. Duty must be given from the unconditioned- non-circumstantial. But alas we will find ourselves troubled with the kingdom of ends, perfect and imperfect duties, the lines for where we are truly unconditioned will blur. So, the a priori – the supreme moral principle is that which gives us the ‘ought’ which allows us, when we give it proper consideration, the means to act morally. Central to this issue is the distinction between intention and ends. Our good will may act toward ends but we are judged solely by our intentions. It is the intention which must be good to be consistent with the categorical imperative. This brings us to duty, imperfect duty and what falls short of moral action. P.18 Duty involves the overcoming of obstacles. “A human action is morally good because it is done for the sake of duty”p.19 Distinction between inclination, self-interest and duty. Inclination may lead us to do what is right but may not have moral worth- moral worth comes from duty. P.19 “Kant’s doctrine would be absurd if it meant that the presence of a natural inclination to good actions(or even a feeling of satisfaction in doing them) detracted from their moral worth.” A man shows his moral worth not from inclination but out of duty. Inclination does not cancel moral worth in an action but it cannot be the only motive if an action is to have moral worth. Only the motive of duty gives moral worth. The distinction made between inclination and duty - the question that they may both be present in the same action is not even discussed in the Groundwork. “Kant holds that we have at least an indirect duty to seek our own happiness.” We act on subjective principles but it is the supreme principle is objective- whether we act on it or not. This is because the maxims on which we act are never “copy-book” maxims. The supreme principle must be derived from a prior considerations and through our individual circumstance we develop a subjective maxim under which to act. The objective moral principle must hold for all considerations, whereas the subjective moral principle has a possibility of being wrong because of the moral agent. Kant formulates several notions of what the categorical imperative must be and sometimes seems to confuse how many definitions he has suggested. But it seems to be clear that the Formulas I and III carry more importance in developing our subjective maxims for action than the other three Formulas. While these other three formulas provide additional considerations for our formulation of subjective principles, they are secondary to the Formulas I and III. Bibliography: Bibliography Gregor, M. J. Laws of Freedom. Barnes & Noble Inc. New York. 1963. Paton, H.J. The Categorical Imperative. Hutchinson of London. London. 1967. Paton, H.J. The Moral Law. Hutchinson of London. London. 1966 Williams, .The Concept of the Categorical Imperative. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1968. Word Count: 3221
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