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On account of the dialogue’s dual effect – the presentation of Socrates’ spirit as well as the Greeks’ inability to define piety – explanations for its incompleteness often place too much emphasis on Socrates and, as a result, fail to unearth its true genesis. Some students argue, for example, that the failure to define piety is induced by the non-existence of the Gods, which they declare Socrates implied through out his life. Hence arises the purpose of this interpretation: to demonstrate, by shifting emphasis to the development of the dialogue, that its failure to define piety originates from the mistaken presupposition that doctrines – systematic explications of religious beliefs – existed within the ritual religions of the ancient Greeks. Since these religions did not contain doctrines, the presupposition lead the search for a definition of piety where none existed, ultimately terminating in an incomplete dialogue. To corroborate this, this essay will trace the development of the dialogue to the presupposition and, therewith, demonstrate its influence in shaping the dialogue’s failure to define piety. The characters in the dialogue are Euthyphro and Socrates, who meet at the Porch of the King Archon. After a request by Socrates, Euthyphro states that his purpose at the court is to prosecute his father for murder. This stuns Socrates, since the ritual Greek religion of the household – in which paternal figures are regarded as family priests – considered turning against one’s father a major act of impiety. In return, Euthyphro remarks that offenders should be punished regardless of who they are, since not doing so makes the pollution – the religious pollution of spilling blood – equal for the offender and the beholder. He then delineates the circumstances of his case: an inferior day laborer cut the throat of a slave and, after being bound by Euthyphro’s father, died inadvertently as he attempted to get advice from a priest. Socrates asks Euthyphro if he has enough divine knowledge to prosecute his father under such extraordinary circumstances. Euthyphro responds affirmatively. Thus, Socrates asks Euthyphro “…what sort of thing…the pious and impious are…” (Plato, Euthyphro, 5d) and “…is not the holy, just by itself, the same in every action…” (Plato, Euthyphro, 5d). Euthyphro, responding to the second question first, affirms that piety and impiety have discernible characteristics. Subsequently, he states that piety is “…prosecuting murder and temple theft and everything of the sort…”(Plato, Euthyphro, 5e). Socrates points out that this answer is not a definition, since, instead of stating what constitutes piety, it merely provides examples of it. Consequently, Euthyphro states that piety is what is dear to the gods. Socrates responds that, if the gods disagree as Euthyphro previously states in the dialogue, different gods would believe that different things are “…just and beautiful and ugly, good and evil…” (Plato, Euthyphro, 7e). Thus, since they love what is good and hate what is evil, the same things would be loved by some gods and hated by others, in turn making piety and impiety the same, which can’t be true. Socrates then induces Euthyphro to state that piety is what all the gods love. Subsequently, Socrates poses a question about this statement’s causality: is piety what it is because all the gods love it or do all the gods love it because it is piety? Euthyphro replies that all the gods love piety because it is piety – because it has an intrinsic nature, untouched by the gods, that makes it worthy of love. This reply presupposes that doctrines exist within the ritual religions of the ancient Greeks, since this intrinsic nature would have to be measured against some predetermined standards to make it lovable. This arrangement of predetermined standards, however, did not exist in the ritual religions of the ancient Greeks, wherein the sole requirement was to perform rituals as well as sacrifices. Indeed, it exists in the monotheistic religions that began to spring up centuries later, which incorporated creedal books – e.g., the Bible and the Koran – to delineate such predetermined standards. In passing, one is tempted to ask: if a monotheistic God is the creator of absolutely everything, is He not also the creator of these predetermined standards, making piety whatever He arbitrarily determines, perhaps with no regard to goodness? Conversely, if He merely recognizes these standards – over which He has no command, – is he, indeed, the creator of everything? In any case, by presupposing the existence of predetermined standards within the ritual religions of the ancient Greeks, Euthyphro directs the search for a definition of piety where non exists. Consequently, Socrates points out that this assertion – that all the gods love piety because it is piety – destroys Euthyphro’s original definition – that piety is what all the god love – since, if all the gods love piety because of its intrinsic nature, piety can’t be pious because all the gods love it. Thus, the search moves on. Socrates raises the question: “Is all the just holy? Or is all the holy just, but not all the just holy – part of it holy, part something else?” (Plato, Euthyphro, 12a). Euthyphro replies that piety is the part of justice that ministers to the gods. Socrates then asks, what benefit does this ministering accomplish? Euthyphro responds that, by praying and sacrificing to the gods, men produce acts that are acceptable by the gods, which the gods love. Once more, in a circular fashion, piety becomes that which is loved by the gods, which has already been proven wrong. Frustrated by Socrates’ questioning, Euthyphro leaves and the dialogue terminates without a definition for piety. Hence, the Euthyphro fails to define piety because it presumes that definitions exist where, in truth, they do not. Nonetheless, despite this incompleteness, the dialogue delivers a full illustration of Socrates’ method and nature of knowing: that recognizing what one doesn’t know – e.g., definition of piety – is the beginning of wisdom. If they recognize this, they may then ask questions, with which they will learn. Bibliography: Word Count: 1037
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