has foreknowledge of all his own actions, but is not the agent of all that he foreknows . . . he has no responsibility for the future actions of men though he knows them beforehand."29 God foreknew, for example, in 1899 that scores of Kosovo inhabitants would be brutely murdered in 1999. This knowledge does not implicate God as responsible. The dilemma of foreknowledge and freedom has, for more than 17 centuries, troubled philosophers and theologians to their grave and, no doubt, will continue to do so.30 Central to both foreknowledge and freedom are (1) the infallible knowledge of God and (2) some idea of human freedom other than a hard determinism. Closely related to this problem is the question of God's relationship to time. There is a sense in which one cannot begin to wrestle with the dilemma of foreknowledge and freedom until the issue of God's relationship to time is resolved. The simplest form of the equation would be to hold that God is timeless, which appears to be Augustine's view. For He [God] does not pass from this to that by transition of thought, but beholds all things with absolute unchangeableness; so that of those things which emerge in time, the future, indeed are not yet, and the present are now, and the past no longer are; but all of these are by Him comprehended in His stable and eternal presence.31 Certainly it would seem that if God has knowledge of all free choices, past, present and future, then he would have to have a vantage point outside of time in order to not be constrained by sequence. On this, Geisler is correct in saying that "God knows everything in the eternal present but He does not know everything as the present moment in time; He knows the past as past, the future as future, etc."32 [italics his]. Therefore, it could be said that God knows all things a priori, yet sees them as a posteriori. But how does this position on foreknowledge and freedom cohere with Augustine's vie...
