itment to an idea and provides the foundation for reflecting on the nature of the idea. If this direct experience shows the idea to be false, then it may be abandoned without further concern. If direct experience, on the other hand, shows the idea to be true, then one can proceed onward with confidence. The function of reason in all this is to grasp and reflect on the nature of the direct experience and, in so doing, determine the truth value of the idea in question. All such definitions of faith and reason are most significant when concerned with metaphysical statements, but they remain fundamentally true in regards to all statements, and, furthermore, in regards to all objects. Having opened that door, I will now venture into even murkier territory: one thing which Optimistic Skepticism leads me to dispose of is the belief that I can begin with myself and reason outward until I have built a philosophical system which provides the basis for rationally dealing with every aspect of existence. The assumption that my own reasoning can serve as the foundation for such an all-encompassing philosophy is not necessary for further rational progress. Formalization of this system might well be a process of apprehending something, which is real outside myself, rather than a process of construction. Furthermore, since Optimistic Skepticism recognizes the need to accept a priori statements without prior proof, then we have already recognized the importance of foundational elements, which have nothing to do with ourselves. We do not create a priori truths, we merely discover them. Our philosophical system, therefore, is founded as much upon these external a priori statements as upon our own reasoning and I become a participant in the process of discovery, rather than a creator of something new. If I do not begin solely with myself to build a coherent system, which provides the basis for understanding and dealing with every aspect of existence, then I...
