ence, then it would be foolish to attempt to build any system of thought on myself. Such an attempt would be like trying to build the Empire State Building on men's shoulders rather than the ground on which the men also must stand. Of course, we are still faced with the questions about what this supernature is really like, but we will return to this later. For now, let us resume discussion of the a priori statements that must form the basis for an epistemology. Foundational A Priori Statements There are four a priori statements, which must be true if there is to be any further progress. 1. I exist 2. Truth exists and is independent of me 3. My reason has the ability to deduce truth 4. The nature of truth is correspondence with an original The real existence, or positive truth-value, of these statements, of course, is ultimately dependent on the supernature. Beyond that, their common feature is that they must be true if we are to proceed. If I do not exist, then my reason does not exist and cannot possibly reveal truth. If all truth were dependent on me, then I could never discover anything but truth and the very concept of truth is negated. If my reason is incapable of deducing truth, then all contemplation is meaningless and cannot serve as the basis for anything, much less a system of knowing. The fourth statement warrants a little closer attention. If I say, "I spoke to Shawn today," the truth-value of the statement is dependent on the actual fact of my having spoken to Shawn that very day. If I did, then the statement has perfect correspondence to the original object and therefore possesses positive truth-value. There is a profound implication in this definition of truth. The implication is this: There exist some statements, which are true absolutely, for they are independent of time, place or individual preference. The two statements regarding truth itself listed above are examples. If they are true at all (and they must be if ther...
