ng this, it would be impossible for him to say that he “knows” what its like to be a bat even though he may know all physical aspects of bat life. The researcher and the bat are simply hooked up in different ways. The same can be said for Mary. She is hooked up in a different manner by not seeing color her whole life, but will not learn any unknown information when experiencing red. Levine claims that Jackson’s problem is that he trying to make an epistemological issue into a metaphysical one without an adequate explanation. This explanatory gap makes Jackson’s knowledge argument not completely sound. By saying that Mary “learns something new”, Jackson is implying that phenomenal properties are physical ones. Yet Levine points out that although Jackson shows that they could be identical, there is no explanation to back it up. Since we can’t know that phenomenal properties are equated with physical properties, there is an explanatory gap which devaluates the knowledge argument. ...
