or threats to the government. However, where Plato specified that only certain types of individuals were capable of becoming rulers, Machiavelli states that anyone with the drive to take power and the means can do it (p. 438). One of the keys to acquiring power and keeping it is to have the support of those that one will be ruling. If a people are generally happy with their government, they will not be very likely to submit to a new mode of rule, or a new ruler. In this vein, Machiavelli suggests that those who “inherit” their power (as in the families that rule states over a long period) have a much easier time of keeping it. The memories that the population has of the ruler’s family will be favorable ones, provided that the ruling family has treated its subjects well in the past. This will obviously favor the newly crowned king or queen that is the “next in line” for rule, since he or she has no need to assert power through forceful action against the people (p. 423). Here is the effect of stable government, where the populace has no fear of a new or harsher ruler coming to power because they have familiarity with the ruling family. In instances where one comes to power through hostile force, though, the job of keeping power is much more difficult. The government has already been thrown into instability because it has been toppled, and the people who formerly lived under it will most likely be resistant to the change. By no means does Machiavelli believe that government is never established through hostile means. In fact, he prescribes three methods by which a ruler who seizes power can maintain it after such actions. The ruler can 1) lay the city to waste; 2) live in the city and among the people he or she will be ruling; 3) create an elite class that will remain loyal to the ruler while allowing the populace to continue living under their old laws (p. 429). Once again, the underlying i...
