een the non-self and self, saying that the evil deceiver cannot fool us about our own existence, but he canfool us about other logical impossibilities. But Descartes deceiver could merely have fooled in the first place bymaking us think that such a distinction between self and non-self exists, when it in fact might not. One can even go further in criticism of the Cogito. Take, for example, what I call the Someone ElsesDream argument. It is seems possible that I might exist only in another persons dream, and my every thought,word, and action is the product of their mind. If I say, I am, I exist, it is they who have said it for me. Icertainly exist in the reality of that dream, but since I might only exist in that dream, I cannot truly say that Iexist. All of Descartes assertions of the Cogito fail when examined by this argument. The omnipotentdeceiver? Hes manipulating the thoughts put in my head by the dreamer. The melting wax? It is being clearlyand distinctly perceived under the light of nature by the dreamer for me. Thus, the assertion, I am, I exist, isnot necessarily true. However, it must be noted that for this argument to work a dreamer must necessarilyexist. The Cogito, therefore, fails whether there is or there is not an omnipotent deceiver. Descartes considered his Cogito his Archimedean point, a claim foundational to all other subsequentinquiry. The Cogito, as shown above, can be falsified. What foundational claim(s) are we left with? It is firstnecessary to note that the omnipotent deceiver has been falsified. This leaves the only objection to the Cogitothe one I raised above. I noted there though that for me not to exist, a dreamer must exist. Therefore, I canclaim that either the dreamer or I must exist. This is a necessary truth. It should further be noted that even indreams, everything in that dream is a construct of existing things. The people, for example, are usually peopl...
