e who use the disgraceful pleasures in order to demonstrate that it is not a good, it is important to show why these claims are not valid. His first reason is to show that these pleasures are not pleasant except to those who claim them to be. If someone is a bad person and calls a disgraceful pleasure pleasant, then there is nothing to say that this is a pleasure to anyone not in that bad condition. Aristotle uses appetites and tastes of sick people to healthy people to show that in different conditions, different people desire different satiation. His second reason follows that the pleasures are choiceworthy, except when they come from disgraceful sources. His example is the obvious one of wealth. The desire for money is fine, but not when it is required to do ill of another in order to get it. His final account is that pleasures could be different in different species. Pleasures that are from fine sources are different from those from shameful sources; and we cannot have the just persons pleasure without being just (1173b30).Aristotle concludes the third chapter by discussing the argument for pleasure differing in species. He uses the friend and the flatterer as his example, stating at 1174a that the friend seems to aim at what is good, but the flatterer is reproached, whereas the friend is praised, on the assumption that in their dealings they have different aims. His next thought is that no one would choose to live with a childs thought for his whole life while taking as much pleasure in what pleases children. There are things that people are eager to posses despite their not bringing pleasure in itself. No matter what pleasures would subsequently follow from having something like knowledge of the virtues, having the knowledge without the pleasures would not deter anyone from wanting it. With this said, it seems obvious that pleasure is not the good, that not every pleasure is choiceworthy in themselves, differing in sp...
