sh speaking person in a room by yourself, armed with a pencil, and the only things on the walls are a series of instructions and rules. There is a door in the room, and on the other side is a Chinese speaking person. This Chinese speaker is able to slide cards under the door upon which are written Chinese symbols and sentences. The instructions written on the walls allow you to respond appropriately to each symbol, well enough so that the Chinese speaker is fooled into thinking you have a formidable grasp of Chinese. Now imagine that instead of a Chinese speaker outside the room, there is an English speaker, and the same things are written. You would still respond appropriately, convincing the other that you are a native English speaker, which of course, you are. Searle feels that the two positions are unique in that, in the first instance, you are "manipulating uninterpreted formal symbols," simply an instantiation of a computer program. In the second instance, you actually understand the English being given to you. In response to the first claim of the computationalists, Searle states, although you respond appropriately, in no way do you understand the Chinese that you are being given and responding with. As far as the second condition, he counterclaims that the computer is simply "functioning and there is no understanding," and with understanding comes meaning. He concedes that although these two claims do not provide the whole of understanding, they may possibly provide part of it, but the rest must be left to empirical data. He does not feel they give any necessary reason as to why humans are operating under the restrictions of formal rules whatsoever.Searle then outlines various replies and his own responses.(1) The Systems Reply: Although the person in the room does not understand the Chinese, it is the system as a whole that does.Response: a.) Simply have the person in the room represent all parts of the system. Th...
