ality. It is these intentional states that are important because what they contain is important by content, not the formal operations of the program. In addition, mental states are a result and product of operations within the brain, but for the computer, the programs are independent and separate. The computer is not necessary. In order to have mental capacities, computational processes are not enough, causal powers operating over intentionality are a necessity. In addition, examining the human mind, we are not merely discussing the sequences with which neural synapses occur, but also the properties inherent in these sequences. Essentially, the computer programs in Searle's eyes lack the semantics and consequently, the reference and meaning. They are simply syntactic. It is this distinction that makes intentionality impossible. Also, in referring to information processing as cognitive science so often does, there is no place within the processing for intentionality, there must be something more. Most importantly, computational theorists create a dualism, by isolating the mind from the brain, with the importance being placed with programs. This assumption and acceptance of dualism is necessary to continue within the computational paradigm. What follows from this assumption is that programs can be instantiated on any type of machine. Searle states you simply cannot isolate off the brain. He uses the example that a computer can simulate the production of milk and sugar, but in the end we have no milk and sugar. Searle states "intentionality isa biological phenomenon, and it is as likely to be a causally dependent on the specific biochemistry of its origins asany other biological phenomena."In response to Searles article, Bruce Bridgeman of University of California, Santa Cruz wrote an article that was in support of the computational theory and a more extensive version of the Robot Reply. Enable this robot with simply more ...
