s the fetus is in a vegetative state and furthermore is not a moral patient since it does not have self-consciousness, abortion can be justified. Like Singer suggests: “If ‘human’ is taken as equivalent to ‘person’ which asserts that the fetus is a human being is clearly false because one cannot plausibly argue that a fetus is either rational or self-conscious. If on the other hand, ‘human’ is taken to mean no more than 'member of the species Homo sapiens’, then the conservative defence of the life of the fetus is based on a characteristic lacking moral significance." My suggestion, then, is that we accord the life of a fetus no greater value than the life of a nonhuman animal at a similar level of rationality, self-consciousness, awareness, capacity to feel, etc. Since no fetus is a person, no fetus has the same claim to life as a person." The applied ethical issue of abortion involves a consideration of the reasons for or against terminating the life of a fetus. Much has been written on the issue of abortion both in the popular press and in the philosophical literature. The debate focuses on two distinct issues: (1) whether a human fetus has a right to life, and, if so, (2) whether the rights of the mother ever override the fetus's right. Often the issues are discussed independently of each other. Discussion of the first issue, regarding a fetus's right to life, usually draws on the concept of moral personhood. A being is a morally significant person when it is a rights holder, and we are under moral obligation to that being. For example, I am a morally significant person and am entitled to the right to life, which others have a moral duty to acknowledge. The problem for moral theorists is to establish a criterion that explains why I am a morally significant person, and a fly is not a morally significant person. Some religious philosophers suggest that we are morally significant persons ...
