estions here. Maybe someday, in the ultimate glory and peak of modern neuroscience we may find out the answer to this "sensus communis" question, but never in the way Arendt, Descartes, Aquinas, and Kant attempt to. In conclusion to this section, Arendt claims that reality is assured and guaranteed to us and by us by what she calls a "three-fold commonness". These three things are the five senses which have the same objects in common (one can disagree here but the disagreement is taken care of by the other two things so it will not be mentioned), members of the same species find objects in generally the same context which gives the various objects their general meaning for that species, and that all other species agree on the objects' identity although in a different context and perspective. When any of these three things are taken separately, one can easily refute them, but I am not sure if it is that easy when they are taken all together.In section 8 of the same chapter, Arendt is critiquing science for the most part. She begins by stating that scientists remove themselves and their thinking from the world of appearances in order to discover what is beneath the surface, what is really going on in the world; why things appear to us as they do. However, she then states (as though what she is saying is contrary to someone else's belief) that once their end is achieved, new knowledge, this now becomes a part of the world of experiences. A good example of this is the modern heliocentric model of our solar system. Science proved what was contrary to the popular belief that the Earth was the center of the Universe. The model with the sun at the center of the Universe now belongs to the world of appearances and is common knowledge. This is precisely correct, for the most part or at least for the scientific community and the scientific realist for the far reaching claims of science.Again, as in the last section, Arendt is making claim...
