ne months. No one else can save him because you have the same blood type. If you don't continue this act of sharing for a period of nine months, he will die. If you do continue the procedure willingly, he will live. The question becomes, if you are an anti-abortionist will you stay consistent and feel obligated to save his life? Warren says that it is absurd to feel as though it would be murder if one declined to share their body (Warren, 316). She concludes her use of this analogy by agreeing with Thomson: even though a fetus is a human, a woman still has a right to obtain an abortion (Warren, 317). Even though Warren agrees with Thomson on some levels, she does mention one problem with this. A fetus comes into existence as a result of the woman's actions; the violinist does not. This is when she breaks off from Thomson and forms her own opinion: the need for the realization that a fetus is not a person (distinguishing between "human" and "person") and does not have a right to life. Section II of Warren's article attempts to define what a "person" is, to follow through with her claim that a fetus may be a human, but is not a person, so therefore has no moral humanity. According to Warren, to be human deals with genetic humanity, the personhood deals with moral humanity (Warren, 319). She claims that if you are a person you have moral status and your rights should be respected, if you are not a person none of that applies to you. So all she has to do is prove that a fetus is not a person, and that will prove that abortion is moral. She gives five different characteristics that classify what a person is: (1) consciousness and the ability to feel pain, (2) reasoning and solving problems, (3) self-motivated activity, (4) communication with numerous possible content, (5) self-concept of individuality or racial ethnicity (Warren, 320). If one refers to the five standards of being a person, a fetus could not be a person, so abo...
