aking his hand. (p.132). In Rachels example the action, or lack of action,is not the relevant point because in each case in the example the actions are the same. Instead, it is the intentions of the person which are important and relevant because theintentions in each case are obviously not the same. I agree with Rachel and I too believethe moral difference between killing and letting die does not lye in the action a persontakes, but in the intentions of a person in carrying out those action(s). Furthermore, it isimportant to understand that if one of the two actions is going to be accepted it is logicalthat they both be accepted because the actions are not morally different. To say that killing is morally impermissible and letting die is morally permissibleor vice versa seems to be ignorant. Specific cases for killing and letting die can bepresented where the equality of the moral permissibility between the two can be put intoquestion. For example, a hunter walking in the woods trips over a rock and shoots hisson who dies, while in the other part of town a mother finds her baby lying face down inwater filled bathtub, does nothing about it, and the baby dies. The first part of thisscenario depicts an obvious case of killing, while the second part depicts an obvious caseof letting die. Although the actions in each case were the same, the case of killing ismore easily morally justified than the case of letting die because the intentions in theformer were good, while the intentions in the latter were bad. It is easy to see that witheach set of circumstances the moral permissibility of killing and letting die may varybecause of the intentions of a person. Therefore, killing, which is the action consideredto take place in active euthanasia, should have the same moral permissibility as lettingdie, which is the action considered to take place in passive euthanasia, as long as theintentions in each are the same because it is the intenti...
