Through cognitive science, computer science, and psychology there has been an underlying question as to what qualifies for intelligent action. Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon have proposed that a physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means for intelligent action. This is a view shared by many other notable figures from a variety of disciplines.What I would like to do in this essay is present an alternative means to attribute intelligent action. I will try to show that there are limitations to the physical symbol system, and that something is missing in the theory. Part 2: Method and Presuppositions In order to show that the physical symbol is not the only means for intelligent action, I am going to attempt to give examples of alternative methods. I will also point out where I feel that Newell and Simon's theory is missing a piece of the puzzle. First I will state the theory of the physical symbol system. I will then give what I feel are appropriate criticisms of the theory. Finally I will show that there are alternative means for ascribing intelligent actions. I presuppose what is meant by intelligent action. This is the underlying question and if this is not already understood then I do not believe that we should be discussing a means for describing it. I will also presuppose what qualitative laws are and how they are used in science.Part 3: The Text's ArgumentNewell and Simon believe that symbols and physical symbol systems are fundamental in explaining intelligent action. In order to understand what a physical symbol system is one must first understand what symbols are. According to Newell and Simon symbols lie at the root of intelligent action. (Newell & Simon, 83). They believe, as do most people, that computers process information in the service of ends. The intelligence of a computer system is measured by it's ability to reach the ends. To reach these ends a computer system must rely upon a ...
