to be a bat and therefore we do not know if a bat is a conscious being. I am not negating the fact that bats and other animals may have experiences and that these experiences are the results of being conscious animals. I am just saying that this has not yet been proven factually and it therefore cannot be used as a presupposition towards an argument. We can only infer that other animals have conscious experience through our own perceptions. We can then make comparisons from our own conscious experiences using these perceptions but this is not sufficient to support an argument.Nagel then proceeds with his argument by demonstrating why we cannot know what it is like to be a bat. A human has an imagination and could therefore imagine what it would be like to have the characteristics of a bat. However, a human cannot imagine what it is like for a bat to be a bat. Nagel supports this by saying, if I try to imagine this, I am restricted to the resources of my own mind, and those resources are inadequate to the task. (p.536). I agree with Nader on this point. In order for me to experience what it would be like to be a bat I would have to make the actual transformation to a bat and there is no way for me to do that. The only other possible way for this to occur would be by a proper explanation about the mind of a bat but this too seems implausible because of the subjective nature of the mind I would also require the actual experience in order to really KNOW.Another objection can be raised to this argument. What if the conscious aspect of a bat is no different than the consciousness of a human being? Why must we adhere to Naders presupposition that being a bat is different than being a human. This does not mean that a bats intelligence is on the same level of a human or that bats can think at all or that bats can even have the same experiences as a person. I am just saying that if a bat has a conscious mind then why should the act...
