ally proposes a counter-attack. In this case, the determinist has launched a three-stage counter attack against free actions. Firstly the determinist argues that, in the widest sense of the word cause, the giving of a reason may function as a cause. MacIntyre argues against this by saying that "to act because you were given reasons to act would not necessarily be to act in a causally determined way." (p. 299) For, in terms of the concept of rational behavior, we can certainly differentiate between a giving of reasons which is causally effective and a giving of reasons which is rationally effective.The determinist then moves to the second stage of his argument. He will say that there are empirical grounds for believing that we can always be mistaken about rational behavior. It may seem like the behavior is influenced by rational considerations when, in fact, it is completely determined by antecedent causes. To disprove this MacIntyre says that such antecedent causes would only determine the event in the absence of logically relevant conditions. In other words, if a logically relevant idea were offered to contradict the event about to take place, it is most likely that reason would take over and prevent that event from occurring.We now come to the determinist final attempt to disprove the act of free will. "He might suggest that advances in learning theory, for example, might teach us that rational, intelligent behavior was nothing more than well-drilled behavior, of which a complete causal account could be given, only provided that that account was sufficiently complex." (p. 300) But how can this be? There are two problems in this suggestion. For one thing, a man might one day decide to stop being immoral. He may weigh out the pros and cons of a situation and decide to go with what is moral. Secondly, if determinism is to rest its hopes on such a complex pattern of explanation then it becomes very hard to either verify or d...
