r would agree that one could switch souls and still be the same person even though one would not have the same physical features. This, of course, would only be possible if the soul were actually made up of something physical. The Materialist is even more general in his/her definition that makes two things the same. Two things only need to have occupied the same body in order for it to be considered the same thing. This could prove to be a problem for abandoned hermit crab shells. Having been occupied by many different times, one can hardly argue that the occupants were one and the same hermit crab. In the case of "Julia and Mary Frances", we are left with a being created from inserting Julia's brain into the body of Mary Frances. A materialist who accepts Lockean views would have great difficulties decided which individual is lying in the recovery room. A materialist deals primarily with the physical features of a person, and seeing that Mary Frances's body is intact, the materialist would say that it would be Mary Frances waking up in the recovery room. However, if the materialist had began to accept Lockean views, then he might be tempted to argue that it will be Julia that just came out of the operation. This would be true, because the new person has all the memories and thoughts from Julia's past and retains nothing from Mary Frances's past. I feel that the person that lives on from this tragedy would have to be Julia. Even though the brain is only one fortieth of one's total body mass, it is considerably the most important part. Without the brain, the body cannot function. Just as a computer will not function without its processor and a car will not run without the digital fuel injection computer chip, Mary Frances's body would have been unless without Julia's brain controlling it. Equally important, Julia's brain continues to retain all the memories and thoughts of her past, as well as her morality and her belief...
