izes human thought as the result of computational processes. Given enough computational power, memory, inputs, etc., machines will be able to think, if you believe this proposition. Proposition two, in essence, relegates the human mind to the software bin. Proponents of this proposition believe that humans just happen to have biological computers that run "wetware" as opposed to software. Proposition three, the Turing proposition, holds that if a conscious being can be convinced that, through context-input manipulation, a machine is intelligent, then it is. proposition four is where the ends will meet the means. It purports that when we are able to finally understand the brain, we will be able to duplicate its functions. Thus, if we replicate the computational power of the mind, we will then understand it. Through argument and experimentation, Searle is able to refute or severely diminish these propositions. Searle argues that machines may well be able to "understand" syntax, but not the semantics, or meaning communicated thereby. Essentially, he makes his point by citing the famous "Chinese Room Thought Experiment." It is here he demonstrates that a computer" (a non-chinese speaker, a book of rules and the chinese symbols) can fool a native speaker, but have no idea what he is saying. By proving that entities don't have to understand what they are processing to appear as understanding refutes proposition one. Proposition two is refuted by the simple fact that there are no artificial minds or mind-like devices. Proposition two is thus a matter of science fiction rather than a plausible theory A good chess program, like my (as yet undefeated) Chessmaster 4000 Trubo refutes proposition three by passing a Turing test. It appears to be intelligent, but I know it beats me through number crunching and symbol manipulation. The Chessmaster 4000 example is also an adequate refutation of Professor Simon's fourth...
