7:504-519). It is suggested, for instance, that the court could decide that rock speech is of lesser general value than purely political speech and can therefore only receive limited protection as a form of commercial speech. This possibility, however, is excluded since music, unlike commercials, does not express any verifiable truths. On the other hand, ad hoc regulations could then still be possible, for instance, to prohibit certain concerts and certain songs, or to supervise the broadcasting of songs on radio (Lazarus 1987:521-522; Gray 1989a:155). The issue of incitement by music was discussed because records that would somehow be proven to cause or incite injurious activity do not fall under the heading of constitutionally protected speech (Berry and Wolin 1986; Coletti 1987; Holt 1990:67-69). But this possibility seemed highly unlikely because there is no proof on the links between, for instance, pornography and rape, and because the contested statement has to be very clear and precise (Coletti 1987:438-443). Therefore, Berry and Wolin (1986:606-608) argue that state and Federal authorities cannot label records because there is no conclusive evidence that exposure to sexual and violent music lyrics causes anti-social or immoral behavior. Popular music would fail the clear and present danger test and therefore does not constitute an imminent danger (Goodchild 1986:182; Holt 1990:69). Although it was acknowledged that the state has an interest in protecting and supervising children, records cannot be regulated because a) the individual has a right to information; b) the state secures its interest in supervising and protecting children through education and not through music; and c) time, place, and manner restrictions can only be made without regard to the content of the message, and if the restrictions are very narrowly defined and leave open alternative ways of communication. In the case of labeling records, all these issues beco...
