that had just begun and was occurring simultaneously (p. 84). Before Russia made several questionable decisions in World War I, the ideology behind the Bolshevik regime was not challenged heavily by the west (Harris). Ulam states, “Until November 1918, the Allied intervention in Russia had nothing ideological about it. It was designed simply to give the Western Powers’ armies in France, which at the beginning of the German offensive in March 1918, were struggling desperately...” (p. 92). However, since the Allies already had troops in Russia already to fight the Germans, it became convenient to offer aid to the White armies (p. 84). After the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1918, Britain and France made several attempts to advance the positions of the White counter-revolutionaries in the civil war by giving aid in the form of troops, supplies, and arms (p. 91). The Allies felt they could also encourage White forces by having “a token troop presence that would stir up the “healthy elements” in Russia into vigorous anti-Bolshevik activity” (p. 91). However, the aid that the White armies received proved to be offset by the lack of discipline, political focus, and capable decision-making that inevitably doomed the White cause (p. 92). The western state’s interventions were also not of dynamic proportions. There were several instances throughout the civil war when the western powers felt the Whites were going to win convincingly (p. 92). The pro-White European states also were limited in the amount of aid they could give considering the monumental casualties that World War I had created, and getting heavily involved in another country’s own civil war would not be popular in their respective homelands (p. 86). The Allies also felt that as the Civil War went on “the mass of the population was turning against the Bolsheviks” (p. 92) , and the Kadet movement would at some...
