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Lippmann expresses his disillusionment with mass democracy, his concerns about propaganda and how the press could not be trusted to provide unbiased information. Contrary to what one would expect form someone holding such views Lippmann also questions the trustworthiness of the chief executive to make good foreign policy, even when he has all of the “inside” information and knows the true nature of events taking place in other countries. He presents several reasons including, the President himself, the formation of a policy and intrinsic qualities of foreign policy, how foreign policy is sometimes used as a scapegoat, and the President’s ability to manipulate information. In addition he also presents arguments which are not directly related to the Presidency but shortcomings in Congress and the democratic system, which contribute to the problem. The President of the United States is after all only human. As a result he is just as susceptible to certain human shortcomings as the rest of us. The one that has the most direct effect on his policy-making abilities is that of stereotypes. On page 173 Lippmann says “ Men formed their picture of the world outside from the unchallenged pictures in their heads. Their pictures came to them well stereotyped by their parents and teachers and were little corrected by their own experience.” If this statement were completely true then human social/scientific progress would be non-existent. Since this is not the case it is safe to say that the situation is not completely dire. However there are plenty of examples which show that Lippmann has hit on a key point here. One such example is the bombing of Nagasaki (second atomic bomb) and President Harry Truman. It has long been debated whether the second atomic bomb was really necessary to bring World War II to an end. There has been much evidence that the Japanese had indicated a desire to surrender prior to the bombing but with the only condition that they be allowed to keep their emperor. An important clue was the diary of President Truman. The following is an excerpt from his diary concerning the use of the atomic bomb: “Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic, we as the leader of the world for the common welfare cannot drop that terrible bomb on the old capital or the new.” When the official order for using the bombs was given there was no mention of sparing cities or civilian targets. The cities were the targets themselves. The point is that Truman’s own personal stereotypes of the Japanese are evident in this entry. The entry can be interpreted as Truman viewing the Japanese as being less than human. When one views another group as being less than human it becomes much less difficult to give an order which will end the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. So it is quite possible that his own personal stereotypes played a role along with the argument that the bombs would expedite the end of the war and save Amercian lives. Yet the general public rarely knows these stereotypes. That is because the personalities of leaders are largely manufactured as stated by Lippmann on page 5 of his book. We view leaders as holding certain opinions and inclinations because either they themselves or their supporters want us to see that. Lippmann goes into much detail concerning the process and motivation behind the creation of any government (including Presidential) policy in his book. He states on page 153, “Every leader must plan his policy based not only on its own “merits” but on also on the following who’s continued support he requires.” This is a sad reality of politics. A policy, especially a foreign policy, should be in line with the principles of the nation and based on what is wrong and right. But instead great sources of influence are different interest groups and lobbyists. The President is an elected official and part of his motivation, which maybe harmful, is what effect his policy will have on his re-election. Another aspect more specifically related to foreign policy formation is given on page 154, “The incidence of policy determines the relation between the leader and the following. If those whom he needs in his plan are remote from where the action takes place, if the results are hidden or postponed, if the individual obligations are indirect or not yet due, the leader is likely to have a free hand.” This is mostly true for all foreign policy decisions. The masses are much more opinionated when it comes to a President’s domestic policy then to the decisions he makes concerning foreign policy because they are not directly affected by them. According to Lippmann as long as the President can convince the public that the foreigners will pay the bills for whatever action is taken and that Americans will benefit by it, he is pretty much free to proceed as he likes. Foreign policy has the dangerous advantage of removing its effects from the public that elected the official who is making the policy. The limit of direct action for all intents and purposes is to say “yes” or “no” to an issue presented to the mass. Another related point that Lippmann makes is given on page 156, “Leaders are not statesmen, and are constantly mending their fences, which can consist of offering an occasional scapegoat, affecting a powerful individual or faction, or acting on some policy issue….” This is a very dangerous situation indeed given that the President is the Commander in Chief of the armed forces. An example can be seen in the bombing of Iraq after Saddam Hussein was found in non-compliance of UN inspection rules. The fact that President Clinton ordered the bombing on the eve of his impeachment vote is the issue at hand. His motives for the timing of the bombing are questionable. It can be argued that he was attempting to influence the public by reminding them of the duties of the President and how he had carried them out to the best of his ability. As a result it can also be argued that the President was using his powers as Commander in Chief for his own personal gain. Many times presidents have turned to foreign policy affairs to divert the public’s attention form certain problems at home. This is definitely a dubious motive for policy decisions and actions. Throughout Lippmann’s book the main theme is the process of how information pertaining to news or factual events is tainted. On page 9 of his book he states “When we do not directly experience an event the only feeling we can have on it are the mental images it arouses.” This idea is the foundation for everything else he says in the book. In terms of foreign policy this is even more applicable because most of us rarely have direct first hand experience in foreign events that make the news. For example, when the Gulf crisis came to be in 1990, for most Americans the only real contact was the media through such sources as CNN. Given that media images are designed to generate certain emotional responses form the viewers Lippmann’s point is well taken. He also points out on page 158. “Leaders have a great deal of control over access to the facts. Every leader is in some degree a propagandist. Consent can be manufactured, the opportunity for manipulation are open to anyone who understands the process.” It cannot be denied that all Presidents in the modern era have used the press to their advantage at one point or another during their presidency. In effect by making the public see what he wants them to see about his foreign policy (emphasizing certain aspects and leaving out others), the president can “manufacture” consent for his actions. During the Gulf crisis a viewer was barraged with images of “smart weapons” consistently hitting their targets, there was only an occasional report on when bombs hit the wrong targets. Also when the President forms his policy or addresses the public he can choose his words as such as to suggest why his policy or action is the correct one by inserting such symbolic words as “American” or “humane”. Lippmann argues this point on page 156 when he says, “Trusted men in familiar roles subscribing to the accepted symbols can go a very long way on their won initiative without explaining the substance of their programs.” Finally another reason why Lippmann’s questions the President’s power in foreign policy issues is the operating structure of Congress (the main body to check his foreign policy powers). He gives an example where an argument in the Senate starts regarding the use of American ships without the authorization of the American Navy. At one point the argument got so jumbled up that fact could not be separated from fiction. This lack of accurate, and uncolored accounts is what paralyzes Congressional ability to overlook the President’s foreign policy efforts just as it corrupts our picture of events. The President comes to the aid of Congress by addressing them at the State of the Union speech but he can tell Congress what he chooses. He cannot be heckled and the censorship as to what is compatible with the public interest is in his hands. In addition when the President makes deals with other nations there has been lack of complete documentation of the details of those deals. This is because they are agreements between one man and another. Yet it is the whole country which must live up to the obligations of the agreements. Lippmann makes the point on page 182 “There is no systematically and authorized way for Congress to know what is going on in the world.” Despite having all of these opinions on the matter at hand, Lippmann does say on page 145, “Whatever their limitations the chiefs are in actual contact with some crucial part of the larger environment. They decide, they give orders, they bargain….”, and on page 144, “The people on whom we depend for contact with the outside world are the ones running it.” In essence what he is saying is that besides all of the shortcomings in the current system of foreign policy, there is little that can be done. He says “We find ourselves trusting certain people who constitute our means of junction with pretty nearly the whole realm of unknowable things. Complete independence in the universe is completely unthinkable.” The main idea of the book was the basis of public opinion and foreign policy will only be better formed when the basis of public opinion is overhauled. This is best summarized when Walter Lippmann said, “It is because they are compelled to act without a reliable picture of the world, that governments, schools, newspapers, and churches make small headway against the more obvious failings of democracy, against violent prejudice, apathy, preference for the curious trivial as against the dull important, and the hunger for sideshows and the three legged calves” Bibliography: Word Count: 1901
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