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The 1953 US Intervention in Iran8221

The 1953 US Intervention in Iran8221 “The Takeover of the Dizzy Old Wizard" Once upon a time, in a mountainous land between Baghdad and the Sea of Caviar there lived a nobleman. This nobleman, after a lifetime of carping at the way the kingdom was run, became Chief Minister of the realm. Within a few months he had the whole world hanging on his words, his deeds, his jokes, his tears, and his tantrums. His personal behavior, which included wearing pajamas for numerous public appearances; speeches to the Majles (Parliament) from his bed, which was brought into its chambers. Frequent spells of public weeping, helped focus world attention upon him during his premiership. Yet, his people loved all that he did, and cheered him to the echo whenever he appeared in the streets. Though, behind his grotesque antics lay issues and ideas that would affect many lands far beyond his mountains (Roosevelt, 1972, p.15) Today, we examine this bizarre leader who went by the name of Mohammad Mossadegh, the U.S. intervention of Iran in 1953 and that conflict’s relationship with the democratic peace theory. Many have heard of the democratic peace but few can relate it to the United States involvement in Iran during August of 1953. I will attempt to illustrate that the democratic peace theory was a relevant and true assumption of actions and relations between the United States and Iran in 1953. To illustrate their relations we will briefly examine the actual confrontation with the Unites States and Iran during August of 1953, to understand if there were any true characteristics of a war. Also, we will take a look at the countries involved to see if they themselves qualify as a liberal democracy. Finally, we will attempt to exhibit any link between the U.S. intervention with Iran during 1953 and the democratic peace theory. But first, in order to gain a sense of the situation in Iran during 1953, it is essential that we examine a history of the events that took place in Iran leading up to the United States intervention in 1953. By 1951 Mohammad Mossadegh had established himself firmly in the political scene in the mountainous country of Iran. Mossadegh ran for the office of Prime Minister with just one campaign promise: to free Iran from the British imperial yoke (Gavin, 1999, p.64). He had also built his political strength, based largely on his call to nationalize the concession and installations in Iran of the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (Risen, 2000, p.10). Mossadegh embodied the fierce nationalistic pride felt by so many Iranians, this brought Mohammad Mossadegh an easy victory (Gregory,1951,p.31). On May Day 1951, after three days of raging Pro-Mossadegh rioting, Mossadegh announced that the Majlis had passed the Nationalization Act, despite strong opposition by many members of the Majlis (Gavin,1999, 65). By this time Mossadegh’s power had grown so great that the Shah (monarchy) was virtually forced to appoint him Premier. Even after being appointed to the Premiership, popularity continued to skyrocket for Mossadegh. Mossadegh’s popularity, growing power, and intransigence on the oil issue were creating friction between the prime minister and the Shah. These small victories wet Mossadegh’s appetite for more power. As a result in the summer of 1952, Mossadegh demanded the Shah appoint him Minister of war (and, by implication, to control the armed forces) (Gavin, 1999, p.65). The Shah refused to let the national army too fall into control of a man he already despised. In response to this decision, Mossadegh resigned. The next four days were followed with pro-Mossadegh rioting. By now, the Shah was forced to reappoint Mossadegh to head the government where he now dealt with the countries foreign affairs (Roosevelt, p.25). In foreign affairs, the minister pursued a very active policy--so active that leaders of nations thousands of miles away, slept restless nights as they tried to find a way of satisfying his demands without ruining themselves. Mossadegh never threatened war. His weapon was the threat of his own political suicide, as a willful little boy might say, "If you don't give me what I want I'll hold my breath until I'm blue in the face . Then you'll be sorry." It was known as political suicide and could be economically detrimental to states around the globe due to Iran‘s oil reserves (Mosasdel, 1989, p.6). Among other oddities Mossadegh governing styles were peculiar. For example, when he decided to shift his governors, he dropped into a bowl slips of paper with the names of provinces; each governor stepped forward and drew a new province (Roosevelt, 1972, p.43). At the same time 4,000 miles away, that blue face of Mossadegh did not alert the administration of President Truman. Truman has initially been sympathetic to Iran's nationalist aspirations (Gavin, 1999, p.34). Under the administration of President Eisenhower, however, the United States came to accept the view of the British government that no reasonable compromise with Mossadegh was possible. Also, by working with the Tudeh Party, Mossadegh was making a probable communist-inspired takeover. Mossadegh's intransigence and inclination to accept Tudeh support, the Cold War atmosphere, and the fear of Soviet influence in Iran also shaped United State’s thinking (Gavin, 1999, p.39). By this time oil production came to a virtual standstill as the British imposed a worldwide embargo on the purchase of Iranian oil. No later than September 1951, Britain froze Iran's sterling assets and banned export of goods to Iran (Cable, 1993, p.21). Finally, in June 1953, the Eisenhower administration approved a British proposal for a joint Anglo-American operation, code-named Operation Ajax, to overthrow the Mossadegh regime. The heavily western supported Shah of Iran, who had appointed Mossadegh, but had then come into conflict with him, gave permission to carry out the operation (McCormick, 1992, p.4). Kermit Roosevelt of the United States Central Intelligence Agency traveled secretly to Iran to coordinate plans with the Shah and the Iranian military, which was led by General Fazlollah Zahedi. However, the coup almost ended before it began when the Shah fled to Rome in the face of demonstrations in support of Mossadegh. It was only when the CIA arranged for counter-demonstrations and more propaganda, that the Shah able to return and take back power Roosevelt, 1972, p.51). Now that we understand a background of the situation that took place in Iran, we are better equipped to understand any relation between the theory of the democratic peace and the U.S. intervention with Iran. But for this situation to uphold the democratic peace theory, both countries involved must be engaged in a true war. For if one is to prove the theory true, they must show signs of no actual war. Therefore, we must identify the actions of the United States on Iran and the reasons for those actions. Bruce Russett, author of “The Fact of Democratic Peace“, defines war on a large scale as, “institutionally organized lethal violence” (Russett, 1999, p.69). Many don‘t understand how we are to know of any lethal violent action taken in Iran during August of 1953 since many of the participants, both major and minor, have kept this military action classified. The names and respective roles of participants were either disguised or omitted from previous accounts. In past years, however, missing American archival material has been found among declassified British documents. Iranian sources and unpublished personal papers have also shed light on this conflict which we can now view a better description of events taking place in Iran (McCormick, 1992, p.4). We only now can see from released documents, that there is evidence that reveals President Eisenhower's authorization for a quick resolution to the crisis in Iran by “whatever means necessary“ (Gavin, 1999, p.68). This stance was a change from the new Republican administration, which took office in late January 1953. The two presidencies differed remarkably by its estimation of the crisis. Truman and Acheson were eager to find a peaceful solution to the crisis, but Eisenhower and Dulles viewed the situation strictly in Cold War terms. They both harbored strong fears about the spread of Communism, which was the climate of the early 1950’s (Gavin, 1999, p.70). Also, John Dulles also had a personal concern in this matter. He considered it one of the major problems facing the administration and not because it wasn't merely a matter of oil. There was plenty of oil coming from other sources to the U.S. The problem was what would happen to Iran without the oil revenue. If Iran should become bankrupt and go into chaos the whole Middle East would be in danger which would in turn effect the U.S. economy and numerous other aspects (Gavin, 1999, p.71-72). In light of this mindset a top secret meeting was quickly convened at the White House between President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles, Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, and Ambassador Aldrich. In response to recent events, the President mentioned that if the present oil negotiations failed, he would want to find a new approach to the Persian oil problem. He could not sit still and do nothing in such a situation. What Eisenhower's statement essentially amounted to was a “green light” to proceed with covert action in Iran (Risen, 2000, p.10). Finally, in June of 1953 United State’s C.I.A. agents along with British M16 agents began to assemble their plot to overthrow Mossadegh. Their plan was known as “Operation Ajax” (United States, 1980, p.588). There were many intricate parts in the U.S.’s intervention plan. The first and largest of which was to the recruitment of numerous Iranian businessmen with powerful connections in the Majlis, military, and clergy. These men organized pro-Shah and pro-Western street gangs on the day of the takeover (Moasddel, 1989, p.16). The second was a simple straight forward part. After severing all phone lines at Mossadegh’s home, a mixture of American, British, and Iranian forces surrounded his home with one tank, four trucks, two jeeps, an armored car, and 60 soldiers (all who were Iranian). They arrested Mossadegh and his guards within minutes (Moyara de Moraes, 1993, 467). There were no death or injuries as a result of the arrest Roosevelt, 1972, p.83). We must be remembered that this feat could not have been accomplished without the complicity of numerous Iranian citizens. It was after all a United States organized operation, but Iranian army conducted a large majority of the physical actions involved (Moyara de Moraes, 1993, p.467). Furthermore, this coup could not have come about in the absence of already widespread dissatisfaction with Mossadegh (Faller, 1996, p.16). Looking back a specifically American actions in Iran we can see no sign of a war by any standard. When we look at the standards for war, as described by Bruce Russett, he mentions that a war is a conflict with more than a thousand battle deaths (Russett, 1999, p.70). There was not one death caused directly by American soldiers or civilians (Risen, 2000, p.467). Moreover, less than half the soldiers in Iran were American. There was a hybrid of forces during the coup (Faller, 1996, p.16). Taking in all this we must conclude that United States intervention in Iran did not meet the definition for war as described in the democratic peace theory. For the democratic peace theory to work, both countries must be legitimate liberal democracies. We come to the question if Mossadegh regime was a real liberal democracy. And even if the United States a liberal democracy. In Russett’s essay, he lays out many different criteria for a liberal democracy. The most prominent prerequisites are the exercising of civil rights, economic liberties, political election voting by citizens, and a three year existence of the government (Russett,1999, p.74). The United States during this time had no trouble at all in meeting Russett’s criteria. The United States was an icon of the time as to what a democratic government is and should be. Numerous experts on political theory, including Raul Geroff, conclude, “United States was the symbol of what a state seeking democracy should strive for. On the other side of the fence was Iran. During the months between 1951 and August of 1953 the country was under the premiership of one man, Mohammad Mossadegh (Mosaddel, 1989, p.17). There were many faces of Mohammad Mossadegh. He had managed to leave quite an impression on the American press. In January 1952 TIME magazine went so far as to select him as their “Man of the Year“. While the magazine described him as a “dizzy old wizard”, America along with the rest of the world was unsure about how Mossadegh’s governing style and political views (Gregory, 1952, p.30). Despite media and societal views, Mossadegh’s governing in no way fits into the mold of the terms laid out by Bruce Russett in his democratic peace theory. One major aspect of this was that there were no contested elections in Mossadegh’s rise to the Premiership (Gavin, 1999, p.65). Mossadegh was neither elected by Iranian citizen nor voted into his position by members of parliament. Mossadegh was brought to power by one man, the Shah, who was heavily influenced by violent, unruly, and undemocratic mobs (Risen, 2000, p.10). Regardless of the Pro-Mossadegh rallies, there was a definite lack of popular sovereignty surrounding Mohammad Mossadegh’s road to the premiership. Another of Russett’s terms for a liberal democracy was that a state must have been in existence for three of more years. Iran had been a state for many years before, yet had not been under the type of governing that Mossadegh ruled with. Consequently, the United States did not intervene with the state of Iran, however, they did with Iran’s newly formed government. In addition to all of Russett’s criteria, when in power, Mossadegh had many ties to the Tudeh Party who were communist oriented (Roosevelt, 1972, p. 44). Knowing all this one can easily conclude that from 1951 to 1953 Iran was not a democracy. For that reason we must render it a non-liberal democracy. Since writing in the past about this specific theory my views have for the most part stayed the same. But, after examining the proceeding case study they have moved to a even greater support for the democratic peace theory. By taking a closer look a the requirements for the concept I was able to gain a better understand and therefore appreciation of it. There are many factors I have examined involving the Untied State’s intervention with Iran during 1953. We have explored the history of the conflict, and also the actions taken by the United States on Iran during the conflict. But most importantly, we viewed Iran’s government through a liberal democracy standpoint. And when looking at the Iranian government in 1953, I found it not to coincide with the conditions of the democratic peace theory. Not because the theory is not valid, but because the Iran/U.S. conflict but it does not meet the criteria set out by Russett. In this specific case we observed one democracy (United States) and one non-democracy (Iran) involved in a conflict that did not serve the definition of war. Thus, I have come to the conclusion that the democratic peace theory is a verifiable and valid philosophy. Bibliography: Works Cited Cable, James. Intervention at Abadan: Plan Buccaneer. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. Faller, James. “Operation Ajax Anniversary.” New York Times. August 17, 1996, pp, 16B. Gavin, Francis J. “Politics, Power, and U.S. policy in Iran, 1950-1953.” Journal of Cold War Studies (Winter 1999), pp.56-89. Gregory, William H. “Man of His Land.” Time. January 26, 1952, pp.29-35. McCormick, Francis A. “C.I.A. Cover Up Revealed” Washington Post. July 8, 1992, pp. 4A Moasddel, Mansour. “State Centered vs. Class Centered Perspectives on International Politics: The Case of the U.S. and the British Participation in the 1953 Coup Against Premier Mossadegh in Iran.” Studies in Comparative International Development (Winter1989), pp.3-23. Moyara de Moraes Ruehsen. “Operation 'Ajax' revisited: Iran, 1953.” Middle Eastern Studies, (Summer 1993), pp.467. Risen, James. “Secrets Of History: The C.I.A. in Iran; How a Plot Convulsed Iran.” New York Times. April 16, 2000, pp.10A. Roosevelt, Kermit. Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran. New York: McGraw-Hill Press, 1972. Russett, Bruce. “Fact of Democratic Peace,” in Michael Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones, Steven Miller (eds.) Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1999), pp.58-81. United States. Congress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Iranian Foreign Policy. Hearings, Subcommittee on Africa and the Near East, 32nd Congress, 1st Session. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964. United States. Congress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Iranian Foreign Policy. Hearings, Subcommittee on Africa and the Near East, 48th Congress, 1st Session. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1980.

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