sis, Khrushchev finally gave up his hopes of intimidating the West into seeking dtente. Improved relations followed between the two superpowers, and by 1963 they had negotiated a nuclear test-ban treaty." (Patton, Page 63.) During the remainder of the 1960s relations between the two superpowers gradually improved. The Americans were eager for improved communication between West Germany (FRG) and the Soviet bloc because "West German intransigence jeopardized their own dtente efforts." (Patton, Page 63.) However, the efforts of the United States and Western Europe to improve relations between West Germany and the East undercut Bonn's efforts to continue its "hard-line" attitude towards it. "In short, Bonn's Ostpolitik was premised on a nonrecognition of the East. This did not present a problem at the height of the Cold War when the West had few diplomatic, economic, and political ties to the Soviet bloc." (Patton, Page 62.) West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer and his successor Ludwig Erhard had refused to acknowledge East Germany as a state along with the Oder-Neisse Line. As the decade progressed, the mutual desires of the United States and the Soviet Union to neutralize relations regarding the territorial status quo of Europe made the Soviet Union less of a threat to West Germany and ensured that its status as a state apart from its eastern counterpart would be around for some time to come. West German foreign relations also became an issue during the 1960s for Bonn was torn between pursuing programs with Washington or Paris, and neither program fully represented foreign interest. "Opting for Washington meant supporting a strategic posture that the German government no longer viewed as fully serving German security interests; and opting for Paris meant supporting a European order that fell far short of Bonn's preferences. Moreover, neither Washington not Paris pursued Eastern policies that satisfied Bonn and that could have ...
