ional regimes moved from attempts to describe the phenomena of interdependence and international regimes to closer analysis of the conditions under which countries cooperate. How does cooperation occur among sovereign states and how do international institutions affect it? Indeed, why should international institutions exist at all in a world dominated by sovereign states? This question seemed unanswerable if institutions were seen as opposed to or above, the state but not if they were viewed as devices to help states accomplish their objectives. The new school of thought argued that, rather than imposing themselves on states, international institutions should respond to the demand by states for cooperative ways to fulfill their own purposes. By reducing uncertainty and the costs of making and enforcing agreements, international institutions help states achieve collective gains.This new institutionalism was not without its critics, who focused their attacks on two perceived shortcomings. The counterargument focused on the absence of a world government or effective international legal system to which victims of injustice can appeal. Second, theorists of cooperation had recognized that cooperation is not harmonious: it emerges out of discord and takes place through tough bargaining. Nevertheless, they claimed that the potential joint gains from such cooperation explained the dramatic increases in the number and scope of cooperative multilateral institutions. Critics pointed out, however, that bargaining problems themselves could produce obstacles to achieving joint gains.Cooperation requires recognition of opportunities for the advancement of mutual interest, as well as policy coordination once these opportunities have been identified. Transaction and information costs are high. The complexity of international politics militates against identification and realization of common interest. Avoiding nuclear war during the Cuban missile cris...
