und, as a majority that the death penalty did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment as a whole. Justice Brennan, however disagreed, and stated that the consideration of evolving standards of decency required focusing upon the essence of the death penalty itself and not primarily or solely upon the procedure under which the determination to inflict the penalty upon a particular person was made. Additionally, Justice Brennan pointed out that the death penalty did not serve any penal purpose more effectively than a less severe punishment, and that our civilization and the law had indeed progressed to the point where the court should hold that the punishment of death, for whatever crime and under all circumstances, was cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In 1995,the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case of Lackey v. Texas (514 U.S. 1045; 115 S. Ct. 1421). In this case, Lackey stated that his spending 17 years on death row constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Stevens stated that the death penalty might serve two principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence. He agreed that neither of these purposes had much value after spending some 17 years on death row. Another case, which was denied certiorari by the Supreme Court, was Campbell v. Wood (511 U.S. 1119; 114 S.Ct.2125). In this case, the petitioner was to be executed by hanging and stated that it was cruel and unusual punishment to be executed in this way. Justice Blackmun, in his dissenting opinion, stated the eighth amendments prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment draws its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. He stated that a good way to obtain a sense of the standards of decency of a society was to look at the legislative action that is occurring. He stated that 46 out of the original 48 that allowed hangings had outlawed them for the basic r...
