eme Court “read in ” the extension of rights to gays in the Vried case . This was a purview unavailable to them prior to the adoption of the charter. Contrary to popular sentiment this controversial interpretation of charter rights avoided a legislative proscription, thus further legitimizing these rights. It might further advance the case for s.33 if we establish that contrary to popular sentiment the courts are not the infallible bulwarks of rights protection that prevailing wisdom suggests. The 14th amendment to the American Constitution was ratified in 1865 but suffrage was not extended to black males until 1870 and not to women until 1920. More conspicuously, it was not until Brown v. board of education that state sanctioned racial segregation was abolished. Court decisions are very much the product of political influence and popular sentiment whether immune from the legislative override or not. In the history of the override provision it can be said that of the 3 instances of s.33 usage one was purely political posturing, so as to be inconsequential. Another was reversed upon renewal after 5 years and the 3rd was not sufficiently controversial to inspire the populace to action . The affect of 18 years of constitutional override is not the relegation of rights to common statute standing, but rather, a more thorough appreciation for them whilst retaining the inherent flexibility and legitimacy of legislative override. The true value of s.33 may not be observed now as easily as it might be in it’s final form. The prevailing notion is that through judicial interpretation or legislative act it should be more onerous to affect legislative override, not to the level of constitutional amendment of the rights in question, but perhaps a moderated super majority . The dialogue created by judicial-legislative interplay is truly indispensable to the democratic process, however the possibility exists that the dialogue could be...
