he product; the only question was whether manufacturer A, B, C etc. had been the perpetrator. What is interesting about the case for proponents of a modified ordinance is that if a woman could demonstrate to the court a harm from the propagation of pornography in general, this case would indicate that all pornographers or traffickers might be held liable in proportion to some measure of their market share. Of note is the fact that only "the producers of a substantial share of the market, that is, over 50 per cent" needed to be sued to invoke this "market share" liability notion. Thus, if a woman could demonstrate the relevant quasi-social harm from pornography, and name producers of at least 50% of the market share of the relevant material, she would meet the threshold for bringing an action. Of course, if a particular trafficker could show that theirs was not a harmful brand of pornography (or more accurately, was not harmful, and thus was not pornography), they would be immune from the action. One problem with this scheme is limiting the named defendants to those who produce an identifiable kind of pornography. I am not confident that in all or even most cases a woman would be able to identify any particular kind of pornography as that which caused the harm she experienced. This is again due to the complex social nature of the harm, its difficulty to pinpoint. There is a danger that an implausible or untenable number of publishers or traffickers of other sorts would be named in any given lawsuit. Furthermore, publishers might begin a "third party" frenzy in an attempt to draw in others to distribute the costs of the suit. However, it seems plausible in at least some cases that a particular class of material could be identified as the cause of the harm, and since (as I shall soon argue) the importance to feminists of the ordinance is not just its success at compensating particular women, but its political and social eff...
