ts within a legal framework not unlike some of the existing legal schema in Ontario which give civil remedies for quasi-social harms. The problem of specifying a perpetrator, while great, is not insurmountable given the doctrine in Sindell and the accepted notion of multiple defendants in civil suits. Finally, though the ordinance may at first seem unworkable (as any new legal doctrine does until it has had judicial treatment), there are genuine fact situations in which redress seems just and plausible. I have mentioned feminist strategy in various contexts in this paper. Of course there is debate within feminist circles over the appropriate strategies for dealing with the problem of pornography. The ordinance, modified or not, will not satisfy every feminist. I think it would be a tenable proposition for MacKinnon and her proponents not only in its provision of a remedy for particular social harms suffered by individual women, but because it will serve to expose the harm of pornography to great public scrutiny, provided feminists devote substantial political effort to particular cases. MacKinnon et al. are concerned that the ordinance should be a mechanism for changing the power relations sustained by pornography. Since the harm of pornography is in a sense held collectively, is social, and since the modified ordinance restricts the cause of action to a single plaintiff on her own behalf as a woman, the modified ordinance has arguably created a law which is unlikely to be pursued. This is because the women most likely to succeed are the least likely to proceed - they either will not possess sufficient power in their situation of subjugation, or they will not recognize the harm since for them it is normalized, adopted, accepted. It is probably true that the ordinance will not turn upsidedown the subjugation of women simply by offering remedies to indiv...
